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Abstract
We develop a model that determines when and how time-consistent and forward-looking courts should set
and reform legal rules (a normative theory for dynamically e¢ cient courts). We explicitly take into account
that: 1) the optimal rules most likely are not the same for all periods of time; 2) courts can only rule at
trials; 3) the enforcement strategies of courts determine the litigation strategies of present and future parties
in con￿ ict; and 4) the parties in con￿ ict can contract around the rules. As main results, we show that: 1)
courts should set those rules that maximize the value of the present parties in con￿ ict (statically e¢ cient
rules) only under extreme circumstances; 2) if legal rules are the only control variables, courts should adjust
the unconstrained ￿rst-best rules for society in order to give the parties incentives to partially correct an
ine¢ cient frequency of litigation; 3) there always exists a distribution of the litigation expenses between
the parties that generates an optimal frequency of trials in which case courts don￿ t need to bias the rules.
The model allows us to analyze the social desirability of two commonly suggested strategies to increase the
frequency of shareholders￿litigation: adding ambiguity to the law or involving public prosecutors as the
N.Y.A.G.￿ s o¢ ce or agencies as the S.E.C. In addition, the model also allows us to discuss when courts
should set contingent rules (rules that adapt to the states of nature) instead of rigid rules (rules that don￿ t
adapt to the states of nature).
Keywords: E¢ ciency of the Law, Myopic Courts, Forward-Looking Courts, Optimal Enforcement
Strategies, Optimal Frequency of Trials, Rigid and Contingent Rules.
JEL classi￿cation: K20, K22, K40
￿Catholic University of Chile, School of Management (currently at Northwestern University, School of Law and Kellogg
School of Management: a-bustos@law.northwestern.edu/a-bustos@kellogg.northwestern.edu.)
yThis paper is a substantially revised version of the ￿rst chapter of my PhD dissertation. I am grateful to Patrick Bolton,
Bentley MacLeod, Dilip Abreu, Luca Anderlini, Alan Blinder, Markus Brunnermeier, Julio Cacho, Pierre-Andre Chiappori,
Arnaud Costinot, Yeon-Koo Che, Tim Leonard, Ricardo Reis, Kathy Spier, Wei Xiong, one referee and participants of seminars
given at Princeton, London School of Economics, Kellogg School of Management, Universitat Bocconi, Pompeu Fabre, Catholic
University of Chile and ITAM for useful comments.
1Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex
(when the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself)
Coke CJ￿ s old maxim
"Our corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of,
evolving concepts and needs. Merely because the General Corporation Law is silent as to a speci￿c matter
does not mean that it is prohibited."
Supreme Court of Delaware, Unocal vs Mesa (493 A.2d 946, 1985)
1 Introduction
Legal scholars and economists suggest that courts are called to set and reform legal rules1 in order to improve
the e¢ ciency of contracts. Courts do that in at least two ways: they ￿ll the gaps left by the contracting
parties because it is expensive to write complete set of clauses, and they constrain the behavior of the parties
whenever ine¢ ciencies such as abuses of power or collective action problems are possible (see Kraakman and
Hansmann [2004] or Becht, Bolton and Roell [2004].) Nevertheless, the fundamental question of how courts
can accomplish these tasks has yet to be answered. For example, what is the concrete problem faced by a
court that has to decide if a legal rule should be preserved or reformed? When and how should courts make
these reforms? When should courts be active reformers of the law (activists) instead of strong defenders of
its original text (originalists)2?
Since the seminal work by Landes and Posner (1976), later extended by Priest (1977), Rubin (1977),
Cooter and Kornhauser ([1979], [1980]), which suggests that common law legal rules evolve e¢ ciently,3 an
extensive literature in Law and Economics has studied how judges should set e¢ cient legal rules. As a
common characteristic, the majority of this work has concentrated its e⁄orts on studying rules that are
statically e¢ cient (rules which are e¢ cient for current technological, economical and legal conditions of
1For example they interpret statutes, decide new issues and overrule former precedents.
2Although the popular press (and also part of the literature) commonly refers to a non-activist judge as a conservative judge,
we prefer to use the term originalist because ideologically conservative judges may very well behave as activists and overturn
precedents. For example, that is the case of Justice Clarence Thomas.
3Under a common law legal system ine¢ cient rules are litigated (and then replaced) more frequently than e¢ cient rules.
More recent research has shown that this result is not robust if judges maximize personal utilities, are biased, take into account
externalities, or face personal costs if a precedent is overruled (see for example Miceli and Cosgel [1993], Harnay and Marciano
[2003], Chu [2003] and Gennaioli and Shleifer [2007]).
2society, form now on, the environment.) While Easterbrook and Fischel (1991)4 have suggested that judges
should always set the ex-ante most e¢ cient rules for the disputing parties (the rules that the parties would
have wanted to write before the dispute took place) Ayres and Gertner (1989), Bebchuk and Shavell (1991),
Anderlini et al (2003) and Maskin (2005) have suggested that that should be the case only if there are no
asymmetries of information and Usman (2002), Bond (2003), Shavell (2003) and Levy (2005) have suggested
that that should be the case only if judges are benevolent.
Beyond recent work by Anderlini et al (2007), Franks and Sussman (2005) and Genniaoli and Shleifer
(2007), as a trend, the literature has given much less attention to the characterization of rules that are
dynamically e¢ cient (rules which are e¢ cient for current and future conditions of the environment.) Given
that in practice, when setting legal rules, courts face not a static but essentially a dynamic problem,5 this
paper intends to contribute to the growing literature by providing time-consistent and forward-looking judges
with a normative theory on dynamically e¢ cient rules. The starting point of such theory is to notice that
there are at least three considerations that forward-looking courts have to take into account when making
a decision that myopic courts do not. First, as environments are in constant evolution the best rule for one
period of time may not be the best rule for future periods. Second, unlike legislators, courts cannot modify
common law whenever they want but they must wait for a trial to take place to reform a legal rule. Third,
the court￿ s rule-setting strategy will a⁄ect the future contracting parties litigation strategies.
Anderlini et al (2007) develop a model that compares the capacities of common and civil law legal systems
to solve the time-inconsistency problem faced by judges (after a trial judges are tempted to set statically
and not dynamically e¢ cient rules.) The authors emphasize how precedents act as a commitment device
that allow common law to adjust more e¢ ciently to environments that change very often. Although the
paper takes into account the evolution of environments, it omits the structural link between trials and rules
because it assumes that trials take place every period. Genniaoli and Shleifer (2007) show that even when
judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, bene￿cial because it washes out
judicial biases and makes the law more precise. Closer to the spirit of our work, Franks and Sussman (2005)
analyze the evolution of the bankruptcy law as a mechanism for the standardization of default clauses6 under
a free-contracting regime. One-period lived corporations write debt contracts that determine the probability
of liquidation of their assets in the case of bankruptcy. Corporations can either write a standard contract
4Complementary analysis can be found in Baird and Jackson (1985) and Posner (2003).
5Because of the legal doctrine of stare decisis (courts are supposed to follow binding precedents) the rules set by a common
law court will regulate/a⁄ect the future a⁄airs of society.
6Default clauses are clauses provided by legislators to ￿ll the gaps left by the contracting parties. While mandatory rules
must be always followed, the parties can contract around default rules.
3at zero cost or write a new contract paying a ￿xed cost, in the last case, a trial takes place with certainty
and courts are called to accept or reject the new contract. Nevertheless, because the decisions of courts are
summarized by a given probability, ultimately, the dynamics of the standards is exogenously given.
In order to develop a framework in which courts repeatedly face trials that resolve disputes of the
same kind, we model the decisions of an in￿nitely-lived, time-consistent and benevolent court facing agents
that live for one period, which we take to be corporations. Each corporation is owned by two groups of
shareholders. The corporations face business opportunities, which we take to be new acquisitions. The
targeted corporations may have more or less e¢ cient charters setting up takeover defenses and courts may
be called to rule on these defenses if one of the shareholders group (plainti⁄) chooses to sue in response of the
other￿ s group (defendant) attempt to reform the charter. Alternatively, the parties can settle their disputes
by contracting around the rules. We model the set of legal rules that regulate the decisions of corporations
simply as the probability that an acquisition o⁄er is rejected (we call this probability the legal standard
of takeover defenses.) A target prefers a high (low) standard whenever it faces a market that with a high
(low) probability generates an o⁄er that will reduce its value￿ an ine¢ cient o⁄er￿ and with a low (high)
probability generates an o⁄er that will increase its value￿ an e¢ cient o⁄er.7 As shown by Grossman and
Hart (1980), an ine¢ cient o⁄er increases the probability that a corporation could be sold below its current
value.8 In the same line, higher defenses give the target more time to analyze the business opportunity,
receive alternative o⁄ers or look for a friendly acquirer (a ￿white knight￿ ).9
An important characteristic of our framework is that it explicitly models the three roles played by trials
in practice. First, at a trial, the court decides if the standard is preserved or reformed (resolve disputes).
Second, at a trial, the court corrects/eliminate ine¢ cient antitakeover standards and replace them with
e¢ cient ones (improve the quality of the law).10 And third, at a trial, all the interested agents (the court,
current and future corporations) learn about the changes in the environment that can be used to improve
the law and/or future contractual agreements (reveal information).11
7Notice that we are referring to the post-acquisition value.
8Given that minority shareholders face a signi￿cant potential dilution of their positions if they stay with the acquired
corporation, they will tender at too low price.
9As shown by Scharfstein (1988) the anti-takeover standard needs to be regulated because targeted shareholders have
incentives to set defenses that are too high from society￿ s point of view (they want to extract a monopoly rent.) To be more
speci￿c, majority shareholders choose the level of dilution of the position of minority shareholders that optimally balances the
attraction of more o⁄ers with the reduction of the o⁄ered price. As a central planer sees an acquisition as a transference of
value, it is only interested in increasing the level of activity of takeovers. Consequently, society always want a higher level of
dilution than the one majority shareholders will freely choose to set.
10Some literature (e.g. Shavell [1997]) argues that trials don￿ t have much value as instances in which the law is constantly
improved because the majority of judicial adjudications don￿ t set new precedents. However, this argument ignores the fact that
when a court follows a precedent it rea¢ rms its validity. Consequently, regardless precedents are preserved or reformed, trials
give courts opportunities to test the quality of the law.
11For example Hua and Spier (2005) mention that the true value of the damages generated by the Exxon Valdez when it
4The paper generates two main results. First, unless litigation takes place continuously, society is com-
pletely myopic, or the environment doesn￿ t change, courts should not enforce rules that are in the best
interest of current litigants. Taking into account the interests of future litigating parties, courts should set
rules that are optimally adapted to the states of the environment that are expected to occur before the next
trial takes place.
The legal history provides many examples in which courts seem to have made wrong decisions due to the
omission of dynamic considerations. For example, in 1985, the Chancery and Supreme courts of Delaware
made a series of legal decisions, as Moran12 and Smith13, that considerably increased the level of anti-
takeover regulation, thus making takeovers signi￿cantly less attractive. These decisions were a reaction to
the wave of takeovers triggered by the ￿nancial innovation of junk bonds.14 This instrument considerably
increased the probability that corporations could face ine¢ cient o⁄ers.15 Though sentences as Moran and
Smith seemed justi￿ed at the time, today, they seem much more questionable given that the market for high-
yield bonds collapsed in 1989 (and with it the wave of takeovers ended) yet these decisions have remained
as leading precedents in corporate litigation.16
Second, if legal rules are the only control variable, forward-looking courts should not set unconstrained
￿rst-best rules (the optimal rules if courts were able to initiate trials.) If trials took place with a socially
optimal frequency then courts would be able to set ￿rst best rules. However, as it was noticed by Shavell
([1997], [1999]), the frequency of litigation is not optimal because the party that triggers the con￿ ict does
not internalize the costs of litigation paid by the other party in con￿ ict (we call this externality: contempo-
raneous) and the current parties in dispute don￿ t internalize the social bene￿ts of a judicial sentence that
improves the law (we call this externality: inter-temporal.) In an attempt to bring the frequency of litigation
spilled oil in the coasts of Alaska in 1989, estimated later in $2.5 billions, could has been revealed and used to deter similar
disasters in the future if the state of Alaska had litigated the case to the merits and not signed a settlement in which Exxon
only paid $1 billion.
12Moran, a minority member of the board of directors of Household International Inc. and potential acquirer of the ￿rm,
impugned the decision of the board of directors to adopt a preferred share purchase rights plan that would make a takeover
attempt more di￿cult by diluting the position of the would-be acquirer (a poison pill.) The Court of Chancery of Delaware
upheld, for the ￿rst time, that the adoption of the pill was legitimate (500 A.2d 1346, 1985).
13Shareholders from Trans Union brought a class action seeking a rescission of a cash-out merger of the company into the New
Trans Union. The Supreme Court held that the board of Trans Union violated its ￿duciary duties (of protecting the interests
of shareholders) when it accepted the merger because it did not act informed, was grossly negligent and failed to disclose all
material facts which they knew or should have known before securing stockholders￿approval of the merger (488 A.2d 858, 1985).
This precedent imposed a higher standard of e⁄ort required by the board of directors at the moment of deciding whether an
o⁄er should be accepted.
14High-yield or subinvestment-grade bonds made possible the massive use of leveraged-buy-outs.
15For example, using data from CRSP, we calculated that the frequency with which an acquired corporation listed on the
NYSE or NASDAQ was delisted due to ￿nancial distress within two years after the merger took place between 1985 and 1989
is double the same frequency between 1990 and 2004.
16Moran is the stare decisis in the use of Poison Pills while Smith is an important reference in the determination of the
validity of the Business Judgment Rule or a potential violation of Fiduciary Duties (by managers and directors) in mergers and
acquisitions.
5closer to the optimal level courts must bias the rules in favor or against the preferences of current litigants.
Centrally, the second result uncovers the existence of a structural link between legal rules and frequency
of litigation (unlike in Shavell￿ s papers we explicitly link the timing of trials and the value of the standard
to the contemporaneous and inter-temporal externalities.) Because we are able to characterize the inter-
temporal externality, the model identi￿es the conditions under which the frequency of litigation would be
too high or too low.17 As general points, we show that the inter-temporal externality is not a⁄ected by the
distribution of the litigation expenses between the parties in con￿ ict; the inter-temporal externality increases
(future corporations bene￿t) with the cost of litigation but decreases (future corporations get harmed) with
the value of the corporations.
In particular two predictions seem especially relevant. First, as in the case in which the defendant doesn￿ t
face litigation expenses the aggregate externality (contemporaneous plus inter-temporal) is negative and in
the case in which the defendant faces the totality of the litigation expenses the aggregate externality is
positive we conclude that there always exists a distribution of these expenses in which the externalities
cancel each other out, corporations generate a socially optimal frequency of trials and courts set unbiased
rules.18
Second, we show that, contrary to intuition, if the costs of litigation, relative to the value of the corpora-
tion, are big enough the frequency with which trials take place is suboptimally low. In this case, courts try to
increase the frequency by setting standards that are biased towards the preferences of current litigants. The
reason why there would be too few trials is that although a marginal increment in the litigation expenses
decreases both the private and social incentives to litigate, the ￿rst e⁄ect is bigger than the second one.
The main results of the paper open a new angle in the debate whether judges should be activists or
originalists (the debate was revived with the nomination and con￿rmation of John Roberts as the successor
of William Renhquist as chief justice of the Supreme Court. At the time, several commentators described
Roberts as a conservative that ￿would not likely push the court to overturn previous decisions.￿ )19 Our
model suggests that the degree of activism of a rational court should depend on the frequency with which
trials take place. Speci￿cally, the standard should be reformed less frequently and biased more moderately
17The common belief among academics (see for example, bebchuck [1988] or Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1991]); legislators
(￿To avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage the litigants to try to reach an agreement resolving their
dispute.￿ in www.uscourts.gov/understand02/content_6_1.html) and even the general public (￿The Most expensive disease
in this country is hyperlexis, too many lawsuits chasing too few facts￿ (Editorial The Wall Street Journal 01/20/92)) is that
American society is too litigious. Trials are seen as wasteful activities whose only role is to resolve disputes that could just as
easily be settled by the parties themselves. However after we take into account the three before mentioned roles of trials it
becomes unclear whether society faces too many or too few of them.
18Although Shavell also makes this point, here we provide an estimable distribution of the expenses.
19Source: broadcasted interviews to Je⁄rey Rosen (Professor at George Washington University Law School) and Cass Sunstein
(Professor at the University of Chicago Law School) on National Public Radio respectively on the 09/05/05 and 09/10/05.
6if trials take place more regularly. Consequently, it is very likely that what is optimum for society is that
judges should be activists in certain branches of the law but originalists in the others.
The model also allows us to analyze the social desirability of two strategies suggested by regulators as
ways of increasing shareholders litigation.20 First, we consider the strategy of adding indeterminacy to the
law.21 We show that the pure addition of uncertainty to the law doesn￿ t improve welfare because the kind of
trials generated due to ambiguous regulation have the undesirable property of taking place whether the law
needs to be improved or whether it does not.22 However, if the parties in dispute have the option to settle
their di⁄erences (in which case the standard is not reformed) at a cost that is neither too high nor too low,
then a certain level of indeterminacy in the law may be desirable. Settlement gives the parties the option to
increase the frequency of trials but the increment may be excessive if the negotiation cost is very low and the
increment may be negligible if the same cost is very high. The result suggests that vague standards such as
the Unocal-Revlon proportionality test23 are more e⁄ective in keeping legal rules up to date if corporations
have a degree of discretion to decide when a dispute should end in a trial.
Second, we analyze the role of agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) or
public prosecutors such as the New York Attorney General￿ s O¢ ce (N.Y.A.G.) as external generators of
trials. We ￿nd that their intervention can bias the frequency of trials toward excess whether it is needed or
not. The reasons are that these agencies can initiate trials but cannot prevent them from taking place and
since the quality of their information is usually lower than the one owned by corporations, there is the risk
that litigations will be initiated when they are not needed.
We end the paper discussing when courts should set contingent rules instead of rigid rules. Although we
don￿ t provide a complete analysis, we suggest that there exists a trade-o⁄ between quality (maximization
of corporations value) and adjustment costs (costs from interpreting the meaning of the rules when the
environment changes.) While contingent rules are of higher quality than rigid rules they also have associated
larger adjustment costs. The relative value of these two e⁄ects will determine which rules should be used in
each particular branch of the law.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the theoretical framework. In
20Which for example would be relevant in branches of the law where litigation is believed to be particularly expensive such
as corporate, bankruptcy and antitrust law.
21As stated by Kamar (1998) ￿while some indeterminacy in corporate law may be inevitable, the degree of indeterminacy in
Delaware law seems too high￿.
22This result must be read carefully because we don￿ t consider that ambiguous but ￿exible rules allow the law to adapt better
to new conditions in the markets.
23The Unocal-Revlon proportionality test is the standard used by courts to determine whether managers violated their
￿duciary duties at the moment of accepting a takeover o⁄er. The test states that managers have to respond with reasonable
defensive actions to threats posed to the interestes of shareholders. A priori it is not obvious what is a reasonable defensive
action or a posed threat.
7Section 3 we describe the problem faced by the court at each trial. In Section 4 we derive our main results.
In Section 5 we test the robustness of the results and develop extensions. In Section 6 we conclude and
mention avenues for future research.
2 Theoretical Framework
We model the decisions of an in￿nitely lived court and an in￿nite sequence of one-period lived parties (P
and D) that own a one-period lived corporation24 in discrete time, all indexed by t on the natural line.25
For clarity of exposition we explain each of the components of the model separately and add four technical
assumptions that simplify the mathematical treatment of the paper. In Section 5 we relax these assumptions
and show that the main results are not a⁄ected.
2.1 Corporations, state of the environment and the standard
All corporations are identical. Each of them has an initial value W and faces a business opportunity (for
example a takeover or a merger o⁄er) with probability b.26 The corporation has to accept or reject the
o⁄er (at this point we don￿ t make a distinction between the parties because they don￿ t directly a⁄ect the
decision of the corporation.) We distinguish two types of o⁄ers: e¢ cient ones (if the corporation accepts the
o⁄er it increases its value) and ine¢ cient ones (if the corporation accepts the o⁄er it decreases its value.)
Consequently, the corporation can make right decisions (it accepts an e¢ cient o⁄er or rejects an ine¢ cient
one) or wrong decisions (it accepts an ine¢ cient o⁄er or rejects an e¢ cient one.) We use this simpli￿ed
decomposition to write the expected value of each corporation as27
(1 ￿ b)W + b[Pr(right decision)￿W + (1 ￿ Pr(right decision))0]
24The expected life of a corporation is much shorter than the one of a legal system (corporations are dissolved, merged or
bought among other options while a legal system will be present along with the existence of a country). Said that, we believe
that the qualitative (although not quantitative) results of the paper are preserved if corporations are modeled as long-lived
agents. It is true that in that case the incentives of a corporation to generate a trial are changed but the negative and positive
externalities persist. Even more, if in our framework corporations were long-lived statically and dynamically e¢ cient rules
would di⁄er more starkly.
25Although it is harder to work in discrete time instead of continuous time (the literature of sticky prices with endogenous
adjustment time provides a framework to analyze problems as ours, see Reis [2004] or Bonomo and Carvalho [2004]) we have
choosen the ￿rst option to make the model more intuitive.
26In reality, this probability is endogenously determined by the legal framework as modeled by Schnitzer (1991).
27The formulation treats equivalently bene￿ts due to right acceptances and rejections as well as losses due to wrong rejections
and acceptances. Our results don￿ t depend on this imposed symmetry and simpli￿es the analysis considerably.
8It is explicit that the value of a corporation that makes the wrong decision goes to 0 while the value of a
corporation that makes the right decision increases proportionally with ￿ > 1. In the case of take-overs this
parameter can be interpreted as the premium obtained by the targeted shareholders when the transaction
takes place.28
We identify the probability of a right decision in the following way. We characterize an o⁄er as the
random price P(t) uniformly distributed in [0;1] at which a raider o⁄ers to buy the corporation29 such that
there exists a parameter ￿(t) 2 [0;1] which determines when the o⁄er is ine¢ cient: P(t) < ￿(t) and when is
e¢ cient: P(t) ￿ ￿(t).30 In other words, the probability of receiving an ine¢ cient o⁄er is
R ￿(t)
0 dP(t) = ￿(t):
Next, we de￿ne the legal standard s(t) 2 [0;1] as the probability that an o⁄er is rejected if the decision is
completely determined by the set of legal rules such that if P(t) < s(t) the corporation has to reject the o⁄er
but if P(t) ￿ s(t) it has to accept it. In other words, the probability of rejecting an o⁄er is
R s(t)
0 dP(t) = s(t).
If the decision of the corporation was completely determined by the standard, the probability of a right
decision would be given by 1 ￿ js(t) ￿ ￿(t)j. Nevertheless, as we know that in practice the standard doesn￿ t
completely determine that decision, we de￿ne the probability of a right decision as31
Pr(right decision) = 1 ￿ F((s(t) ￿ ￿(t))2)
where F : [0;1] ! [0;1] captures the degree in which the regulation a⁄ects the ￿nal decision. At this point
we prioritize tractability of the model and assume that
Technical Assumption 1: F(x) = x:
REMARK (Standard) In practice, many corporate decisions are strongly a⁄ected, although o⁄ course
not completely determined, by the set of rules enacted by legislators (statutes) and courts (case law) that are
usually written into the charters of the corporation (what we call the standard.) For example the capacity
of a manager to reject a takeover strongly increases if a poison pill is in place or the board of directors is
staggered, equally, shareholders can get more or less involved in the decision process depending on how easy
it is for them to call meetings or to vote.
28Black and Grundfest (1988) suggest that this premium ranges between 1.3 and 1.5.
29The strong assumption that o⁄ers are randomly generated is partially mitigated by the fact that in average raiders break
even in acquisitions (see Gilson and Black [1995]).
30The cut-o⁄ ￿(t) can be interpreted as the initial value of the corporation normalized by its expected maximum (post-
acquisiton) value. This last value will depend on the capacity of the raider to improve the management, generate synergies or
exploit tax bene￿ts in the acquired corporation (in a period of high level of ine¢ cient activity, the maximum post-acquisition
value is smaller than the same value in a period of low level of ine¢ cient activity.)
31This expression penalizes in the same way too stringent (s(t) > ￿(t)) or too soft standards (s(t) < ￿(t)).
9Within this framework the expected value of corporation t turns to be an increasing function on how well
the law tracks the state of the environment represented by the parameter ￿(t)
U(s(t);￿(t)) = (1 ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿))W ￿ b￿W(s(t) ￿ ￿(t))2
= f W ￿ b￿W(s(t) ￿ ￿(t))2
where f W = (1 ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿))W: In order to introduce the notion that the environment is in constant change
we notice that at every period a corporation may face ine¢ cient o⁄ers with a high or low probability.32 In
terms of the model we assume that ￿(t) 2 f￿L;￿Hg with 0 < ￿H < ￿L < 1 follows a Markov process with
transition probabilities
q1 = Pr[￿(t + 1) = ￿L j ￿(t) = ￿L]
q0 = Pr[￿(t + 1) = ￿L j ￿(t) = ￿H]
and ￿ = q1 ￿ q0 > 0:
2.2 Information process
The parties and the court have the same information which is summarized by the following su¢ cient statistic:
p(t) = Pr[￿(t) = ￿L j ￿t] where ￿t is the information available at the beginning of period t: Although in
reality agents are able to extract information about the environment from the decisions of former corporations
facing business opportunities, here we restrict the sources of information only to trials (in Section 5 we allow
the parties to learn outside the litigation process)
Technical Assumption 2: All agents learn the true state of the environment at trials which are the
only sources of information.
REMARK (Information and the Standard) The assumption that the parties in con￿ ict learn about the
state of the environment at trials should not be understood literally as that the parties learn about the
economy and the markets. That may be true for the judge but clearly not for the parties. What the
32There are two reasons why this is the case. First, changes in markets may generate or eliminate rent opportunities (Shleifer
and Vishny [1991] suggest that the wave of takeovers of the ￿ 80s was most likely triggered by an ine¢ cient level of diversi￿cation
of corporations initiated in the ￿ 60s.) Second, ￿nancial innovations (like high yield bonds or bridge loans), technological progress
(like computers or internet) and also changes in the characteristics of corporations (like the use of Special Purpose Units in
mergers) may alter the level of activity and the type of o⁄ers faced by the targets.
10parties learn at a court room is whether the legal framework/standard still is or not adequate for the new
environment. And that will be determined by the expert analysis of the judge.
At trials, agents realize that ￿(t) = ￿H =) p(t) = 0 or that ￿(t) = ￿L =) p(t) = 1: Given the information
process we index p(t) by the state of the environment most recently revealed to all agents in the following
way
pH(t) = Pr[￿(t) = ￿L j ￿t;at the last trial environment was revealed ￿H]
pL(t) = Pr[￿(t) = ￿L j ￿t;at the last trial environment was revealed ￿L]
In the periods without a trial (we call it a cycle) beliefs are adjusted according to the Markovian process
pn(t + 1) = pn(t)q1 + (1 ￿ pn(t))q0 which becomes pH(t) = q0(1 ￿ ￿t￿1)=(1 ￿ ￿) when, at the last trial,
the environment was revealed to be High or pL(t) =
￿
q0 + (1 ￿ q1)￿t￿1￿
=(1 ￿ ￿) when it was revealed to
be Low. Notice that pH(t) < pL(t) for all t and both processes converge to the same stationary probability
p￿ = q0=(1￿￿): During a cycle the Markovian process generates an information decay process.33 That is, at
time t, the probability that the state of the environment coincides with the one that was discovered at the
trial is smaller than the same probability at time t ￿ 1: Consequently, the expected value of a corporation
facing standard s(t) and having beliefs pn(t) is given by
V (s(t);pn(t)) = pn(t)U(s(t);￿L) + (1 ￿ pn(t))U(s(t);￿H)
= f W ￿ b￿W
￿
pn(t)(s(t) ￿ ￿L)2 + (1 ￿ pn(t))(s(t) ￿ ￿H)2￿
Notice the loss-function shape of the last expression. The value of the corporation is penalized by the
distance of the standard to the current state of the environment. It is clear from the information decay
process that the expected value of a corporation will constantly decrease due to the belief that the law is
becoming less adequate for the current environment.
33Harris and Holmstrom (1987) have the same property in a model in which an in￿nitely lived lender has to decide every
period whether to pay a cost to collect information about the quality of an in￿nitely lived borrower to whom is deciding to
￿nance.
112.3 The court
In our model, there is a unique34 and time-consistent court that acts as a central planner (the obvious
analogy is the Supreme Court.) Although we recognize that the court faces di⁄erent incentives before and
after a trial takes place35 and we discuss that in Sections 4 and 5, at this point we assume that
Technical Assumption 3: The court commits to the strategy that maximizes the value of all corpora-
tions at t = 1.
The court can only reform the legal standard at trial. More speci￿cally, whenever it resolves a dispute
it decides whether to preserve or modify the current standard. We denote this decision the enforcement
strategy s(￿(t)) = sn : f￿L;￿Hg ￿! [0;1]: For parsimony we refer to the opposite standard of sn as s￿n.
2.4 Parties, attempts to reform the standard and the litigation process
We consider that at the beginning of period t, D owns a fraction ￿1 of the corporation while P owns a
fraction 1￿￿1. If the standard is modi￿ed (either because the parties (D;P) agree to do that or because the
court decides that at a trial) the ownership of the corporation is changed such that now D owns a fraction
￿2 > ￿1 and P owns a fraction 1 ￿ ￿2 < 1 ￿ ￿1:
REMARK (Distributional e⁄ects) Disputes about the content of corporate law often end in trials due to
strong con￿ icts of interest among the corporate constituents. Managers, minority shareholders and outsiders
want to set ￿tougher￿standards than shareholders, minority shareholders and insiders respectively. Managers
oppose a reduction of the standard because that would expose them to loose their jobs or the control of the
corporation. That logic generated a trial in Revlon.36 Minority Shareholders do the same because a takeover
would dilute their positions. That logic generated a trial in Weinberger.37 And creditors see a takeover as a
threat to the value of their securities because the corporation will be perceived as a riskier institution. That
logic generated a trial in Nabisco.38
34In reality there is a multiplicity of courts. The U.S. judicial system is organized in a three-hierarchical structure: trial
courts, appeal courts and supreme courts. In addition to the regular state and federal systems there are specialized courts in
bankruptcy, trade and commerce among other areas.
35As we mentioned in the introduction, Riboni (2006) analyzes in detail the di⁄erent ways in which common and civil law
address the potential time-(in)consistency of courts￿decisions.
36Bidder for corporations stock brought action to enjoin certain defensive actions taken by the target corporation and others.
The Supreme Court of Delaware held among other things that (2) actions taken by directors in the instant case did not meet
that standard and (6) when sale of the company becomes inevitable, duty of board of directors changes from preservation of
the corporate entity to maximization of the company￿ s value at a sale for the stockholders￿bene￿ts (506 A.2d 173, Del 1985).
37A former shareholder of UOP Inc. brought a class action against the corporation challenging the UOP￿ s minority share-
holders by a cash-out merger between UOP and its majority owner, The Signal Companies, Inc. The Chancellor held that the
terms of the merge were fair to the Plainti⁄ and the other minority shareholders of UOP (457 A.2d 701, Del 1983).
38Courts have developed complete doctrines in order to regulate each of these con￿icts of interest. For example, under the
duties of care and loyalty (￿duciary duties) managers are required to satisfy a standard of e⁄ort when they make decisions
12REMARK (Reason for a trial) There are four theories that explain why parties litigate on the merit and
don￿ t settle their di⁄erences: 1) there are asymmetries of information; 2) parties have di⁄erent expectations
on the decision of the court; 3) one party is a behavioral type and 4) the parties search the expertise of the
court. In our paper we adhere to the fourth theory. At any time in which the parties believe that the law is
not adequate for the current environment they will call for the judicial expertise and authority of a judge to
determine the new appropriate regulatory setting.
The details of what the parties must decide during the period are described in the following three-stage
game:
Stage 1: D decides to attempt a change of the standard or preserve the current standard. In the case
of a change attempt: if the standard is sn; D proposes standard s￿n:
Stage 2: If D initiated a change then P decides whether to accept the new standard or sue D.
Stage 3: If P sues D then D makes P a take-it-or-leave-it settlement o⁄er S. If P accepts the o⁄er the
corporation adopts the new standard. If P doesn￿ t accept the o⁄er the parties go to court who decides the new
standard. If the court changes the standard, D must compensate the harm su⁄ered by P which is equivalent
to the reduction in the value of her share in the corporation (h = (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿H) if
the standard is sL and h = (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿L) if the standard is sH).39
Notice that if the standard is changed by mutual agreement of the parties or P accepts a settlement
o⁄er (we denote any of these two options: contracting around the old standard) society keeps facing the old
standard because the court has made no decision.
We denote the aggregate cost of litigation (faced by both parties) as c < W: From that amount, D pays
fc; with f ￿ 1 while P pays (1￿f)c: In addition, although in reality legal disputes happen both before the
target faces the o⁄er (as was the case in Moran) and during the time in which the o⁄er is taking place (as
was the case in Lynch)40, at this point we assume that only the ￿rst option is possible (as with the other
on behalf of shareholders, under the doctrine of entire fairness, majority shareholders are required to assure that the interests
of minority shareholders are protected during a merger (a change in control and ownership of a corporation must protect the
interests of all shareholders (a fair deal) and must be done at a price that is bene￿cial for all shareholders (a fair price))
and under the doctrine of antifraud standards, shareholders are required to protect the interests of creditors whenever the
corporation changes ownership.
39Although in corporate disputes, injunction is the usual remedy, in our context that would imply that the court obviates
the distributive e⁄ects (over the parties welfare) of its decision.
40Shareholder (Kahn) brought action against controlling shareholder (Alcatel) to recover for breach of ￿duciary duties to
shareholders and corporation acquired by controlling shareholder (Lynch). According to Kahn, Alcatel dictated the terms
of the merger; made false, misleading and inadequate disclosures; and paid an unfair price. The Supreme Court held that
the exclusive standard of judicial review in examining propriety of interested, cash-out merger transaction by controlling or
dominating shareholder is ￿entire fairness￿, and that the burden to prove entire fairness never shifted from controlling shareholder
(638 A.2d 1110, Del 1994).
13assumptions, we relax it in Section 5)
Technical Assumption 4: The three-periods game (ergo, the trial if any) takes place before corpora-
tions face a business opportunity.
As we will see when we present the solution of the problem, in equilibrium there are situations in which
the parties contract around the standard, however, as we are mainly interested in keeping track of the court
interventions we denote the litigation strategy as the function l(pn(t);s(t)) = ln(t) : [0;1]2 ￿! f0;1g in
which ln(t) = 1 means that a trial takes place at time t while ln(t) = 0 means the contrary.
2.5 Dynamics of the System and Timing of Actions
Our problem is stationary and not path dependent.41 That implies that the number of periods in a cycle
is deterministic. The randomness of the process is given by the uncertainty of the state of the environment
that is revealed at future trials (which consequently makes random the timing of trials after the current cycle
ends.) We de￿ne the periodicity ￿n ￿ 1; as the number of periods in which the system has standard sn
42
or equivalently, the number of corporations that don￿ t innovate in their charters when the standard is sn:
Often we will refer to the frequency of litigation 1=￿n 2 [0;1] instead of the periodicity. We also take this
opportunity to explicitly write the timing of the actions that take place every period.
1. Environment realizes ￿(t): Not observed by the agents.
2. Agents adjust their beliefs: p(t ￿ 1) ! p(t):
3. Parties D and P; owners of corporation t; facing standard s(t￿1) and having beliefs p(t); play a three
stage-game and decide l(t).
4. If l(t) = 1 then a trial takes place, cost fc is paid by D, cost (1 ￿ f)c is paid by P, p(t) becomes 1 or
0 and the Court decides s(t):
5. If l(t) = 0 then a trial doesn￿ t take place, no information is revealed.
6. A business opportunity takes place or not, the payments of the game are realized and discounted at
the beginning of the period.
41This may seem a major limitation in a model of common law in which judges are obliged to follow precedents. Nevertheless,
as Atiyah and Summers (1987) point out, there is an even deeper principle of common law that precedes path dependence:
substantivity. The American common law legal system is committed to use socioeconomic and/or political arguments to justify
any application or interpretation of the law. It is not enough to apply the law because it is the law (formal principle). As the
quality of legal rules should be constantly tested, path dependence would be the attribute of the law only if that proves to be
adequate for the times. Under this considerations, our model can be interpreted in the following way: Whenever judges decide
to preserve the standard they are following precedents but whenever decide to reform it they are updating the law to the new
requirements of times.
42A high ￿n means that the standard sn is unfrequently litigated.
143 The Court sets the standards
In this Section we formulate the problem faced by the court when it has to decide what standards to set
each time a trial takes place. Nevertheless, ￿rst, we study the behavior of the disputing parties. That is, we
derive the parties litigation strategies.
3.1 Litigation strategies
Due to the information decay process, the probability that the current standard is inadequate (or obsolete)
constantly increases with time. That implies that the probability that D attempts a change of the standard
increases with time as well. P may bene￿t from the update of an obsolete standard but faces the cost of
reducing its share in the company. It is easy to show that P￿ s utility is always reduced if she accepts D￿ s
￿rst attempt to change the standard. By ￿rst attempt we mean the following: we will show that there exists
cut-o⁄ beliefs about the state of the environment (upper bound if the standard is low and lower bound if
the standard is high) such that any belief beyond those cuto⁄s induce D to attempt a reform. First attempt
refers to the ￿rst time in which beliefs hit the cuto⁄s.
P has two ways of responding to an innovation that reduces her utility. She can accept the innovation
or challenge it by suing D: A lawsuit takes place when the expected bene￿ts of a legal dispute (standards
update with complete information and compensation from inequity e⁄ects) dominate the litigation costs of
the same. For obvious reasons, in the case of a lawsuit, the parties go ahead for a court ruling instead of
settling their dispute if and only if the litigation costs are not large. Consequently, as a general description of
the litigation strategies, regardless whether the standard is high or low, we have that an attempt to change
the standard triggers a trial with certainty if the litigation cost is lower than a certain threshold but the
parties contract around D￿ s attempt if the litigation cost is higher than the same threshold. In that last case
the standard is not reformed and parties (D;P)t+1 face the same standard that parties (D;P)t faced before.
The next lemma summarizes the solution of the three-stage game. We relegate the details to Appendix A.
Lemma 1: (Litigation strategies)
i) when s(t ￿ 1) = sL there exists costs of litigation cL1 ￿ cL2 and periodicities of litigation ￿L; ￿L;
and ￿L such that if c > cL2; D initiates a change that is accepted by P when t = ￿L; if c 2 [cL1;cL2]; D
initiates a change that ends in a settlement when t = ￿L and if c < cL1; D initiates a change that ends in
15a trial when t = ￿L; where ￿L is de￿ned as
￿L = argmin
￿2N
f(1 ￿ pL(￿ + 1))(V (sH;0) ￿ V (sL;0)) ￿ fcg
ii) when s(t ￿ 1) = sH there exists costs of litigation cH1 ￿ cH2 and periodicities of litigation ￿H; ￿H;
and ￿H such that if c > cH2; D initiates a change that is accepted by P when t = ￿H; if c 2 [cH1;cH2]; D
initiates a change that ends in a settlement when t = ￿H and if c < cH1; D initiates a change that ends in
a trial when t = ￿H; where ￿H is de￿ned as
￿H = argmin
￿2N
fpH(￿ + 1)(V (sL;1) ￿ V (sH;1)) ￿ fcg
Proof: See Appendix A.
Because in the case that c > minfcL1;cH1g we converge to a scenario in which society doesn￿ t face trials
at all43 and the conclusions are not interesting we perform the analysis of the paper with the understanding
that c ￿ minfcL1;cH1g. That is, any attempt to reform the standard ends with a court ruling. Notice that
if we allowed for heterogeneity in the characteristics of the corporations (e.g. W is drawn from a certain
distribution) we would retrieve the more accurate description of reality in which some disputes settle and
others go to trial.44
3.2 The Problem faced by the Court
A benevolent, forward-looking and time-consistent court who at a trial discovers that the state of the en-
vironment is ￿n with n 2 fH;Lg; sets the standard sn that optimally regulates corporations a⁄airs for ￿n
periods knowing that the standard s￿n optimally regulates corporations a⁄airs for ￿￿n periods (in other
words, the court chooses the standard sn that maximizes the expected value of current and future corpora-
tions knowing that a corporation will generate a trial in ￿n periods and at that trial the standard may be





there will be trials until the moment in which the court discovers that the state of
nature has changed, if c > maxfcL1;cH1g trials never take place.
44We didn￿ t explore a model with heterogeneous ￿rms because the de￿nition of heterogeneity would have been idiosyncratic,







fpH(￿ + 1)(V (sL;1) ￿ V (sH;1)) ￿ fcg (2)
￿L = argmin
￿2N
f(1 ￿ pL(￿ + 1))(V (sH;0) ￿ V (sL;0)) ￿ fcg (3)
sL;sH 2 [0;1];￿L;￿H ￿ 1;n 2 fH;Lg;p(1) 2 f1;0g given
The expected values of current and future corporations (￿L and ￿H) are de￿ned by the following system
of Bellman equations45
￿L = r(sL;￿L) ￿ ￿
￿Lc + ￿
￿L [pL(￿L + 1)￿L + (1 ￿ pL(￿L + 1))￿H] (4)
￿H = r(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿
￿Hc + ￿
￿H [pH(￿H + 1)￿L + (1 ￿ pH(￿H + 1))￿H] (5)
Each equation tells us that ￿n is equal to the expected value of the corporations during the ￿rst cycle




minus the cost ￿
￿nc incurred in the trial that ends the cycle) plus the expected value of the corporations
including litigation expenditures associated to the future cycles (￿
￿n [pn(￿n + 1)￿L + (1 ￿ pn(￿n + 1))￿H]).
The system of equations de￿nes the following closed form expressions for ￿L and ￿H
￿L =
(1 ￿ ￿H(1 ￿ pH))(rL ￿ ￿Lc) + ￿L(1 ￿ pL)(rH ￿ ￿Hc)
(1 ￿ ￿LpL)(1 ￿ ￿H) + ￿HpH(1 ￿ ￿L)
￿H =
￿HpH(rL ￿ ￿Lc) + (1 ￿ ￿LpL)(rH ￿ ￿Hc)
(1 ￿ ￿LpL)(1 ￿ ￿H) + ￿HpH(1 ￿ ￿L)
with ￿L ￿ ￿
￿L;￿H ￿ ￿
￿H;pL ￿ pL(￿L + 1) and pH ￿ pH(￿H + 1).
The solution of (1) de￿nes a Nash equilibrium (indeed a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) when ￿ is big
enough.)46 The uncertainty of the problem is given by the timing at which trials take place. At equilibrium,
agents know ￿H and ￿L but they don￿ t know what will be the state of the environment revealed at the next
45The characteristics of the dynamic programing problem that de￿nes those equations are: the state variable is the state of
nature revealed at a trial ￿(z) 2 f￿L;￿Hg; the control variable is the standard sn 2 fsL;sHg, the law of motion is pn(￿n +1) =
Pr[￿(z + 1) = ￿L j ￿(z) = ￿n] with p(1) given, the ￿￿periods return functions are rn = r(sn;￿n) =
P￿n
t=1 ￿t￿1V (sn;pn(t)) and
the discount factors are ￿￿n:
46We don￿ t have SPE because the information sets are not singleton. Before trials take place corporations don￿ t know what
standard will be set by the Court.
17trial (and consequently what will be the next standard.) Inequalities (2) and (3) are the incentive constraints
faced by corporations when they decide to generate a trial or not. Notice that because the litigation strategy
determines the values of ￿H and ￿L we have omitted ln(t). As an initial condition, we assume that a trial
takes place at t = 1 with certainty.
We end this section establishing a technical result that will prove useful later.
Lemma 2: (Objective function) ￿n is quasi-concave in ￿n and strictly concave in sn:
Proof: See Appendix A.
4 Main Results
In this section we present our main results. In order to do that, we solve (1) in three steps. First, we
determine the solution of a legal system in which the court is myopic (￿ = 0):47 After that, in a second step
we determine the standard and frequency of trials that a central planer would like to impose in society, that
is we determine the ￿rst best common law legal system. Finally we solve (1) distinguishing that only the
court can enforce the standards while corporations decide when to generate trials. As the solution will turn
to be a combination between the myopic and the ￿rst best solutions we will refer to it as the second best
solution.
4.1 Myopic Courts
A myopic court48 adjudicates cases as if judicial sentences didn￿ t have e⁄ects either in the welfare of future
corporations or in the future enforcement of the law. The system still has dynamics because corporations
decide when to litigate. The solution is trivially characterized as follows
Myopic Court Solution: A myopic court (￿ = 0) sets standards that perfectly track the environment
sM






=ln￿c + 1 where cM
H =
b￿bWp￿(￿H ￿ ￿L)2c=f; cM
L =
￿
￿bW(1 ￿ p￿)(￿H ￿ ￿L)2￿
=f and n 2 fH;Lg:49
A myopic court sets standards that perfectly track the state of the environment because they maximize
the value of the litigating corporation. The result is consistent with the traditional view in which courts
should enforce the contract that the parties would have wanted to write before they faced the con￿ ict. If
47Many legal scholars would agree that in reality judges behave more myopically than forward-looking. For example Cooter
and Kornhauser (1980) say that ￿it is di¢ cult to contend that judges have insight beyond that displayed in their written
opinions, and these opinions re￿ect a calculus of economic costs and bene￿ts only in a narrow class of cases￿.
48In this case it becomes irrelevant whether there is one or many judges.
49bxc is the maximum integer smaller than or equal to x 2 R:
18the myopic court wasn￿ t benevolent or didn￿ t act completely informed then the standards would not track
the environment any more.50 Notice that the role of myopic courts is not negligible because they don￿ t just
enforce current rules but they reform them at any time when they have become obsolete.
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=(1￿￿). The frequency of litigation increases
with the expected value of the corporation (￿bW) but decreases with the cost of litigation (c) as well as
with the fraction of the costs paid by D (f). Notice that if c > maxfcM
L ;cM
H g, litigation never takes place.52
In addition, the longer the environment is in one state (captured by the value of p￿) the less frequently the
associated standard is litigated (society wants to stay longer with this standard.)
However, e¢ ciency minded courts are forward looking agents (￿ > 0) who take into account the future
implications of their adjudications. Next, we analyze what is di⁄erent in a dynamic framework.
4.2 First Best Solution
In this Section we assume that a central planner can simultaneously initiate trials and enforce the standard.
First we show that for any ￿xed frequency of trials a central planer does not want to set a standard that
tracks the environment unless the parameters of the model adopt extreme values. Second we show that for
any ￿xed standard a central planer does not want to generate trials with the same frequencies as corporations.
Third we combine both results and characterize the standards and frequencies of trial that de￿ne the ￿rst
best common law legal system.
4.2.1 First Best Standards
Suppose that a central planner faces exogenously given periodicities of litigation ￿n. In this case, when a
trial takes place, a central planner sets the standard that maximizes the value of all corporations during a
50For example, if in our model the court observes the true state of nature with probability 1 ￿ e it sets standards sM
L (e) =
(1 ￿ e)￿L + e￿H and sM
H (e) = e￿L + (1 ￿ e)￿H:
51Although strictly speaking, the next relations are inequalities, w.l.o.g., to simplify notation and the rest of the analysis we
write them as identities.
52Obviously if minfcL1;cH1g < maxfcM
L ;cM
H g; the last bound is not relevant.
19cycle (the ￿￿periods return functions). That is
sFB
H (￿H) = (1 ￿ A(￿H))p￿￿L + (1 + A(￿H))(1 ￿ p￿)￿H (8)
sFB
L (￿L) = (1 + A(￿L))p￿￿L + (1 ￿ A(￿L))(1 ￿ p￿)￿H (9)




1￿￿￿ : A central planner doesn￿ t want to set standards that track the environment
anymore. Given that they will regulate the a⁄airs of corporations for ￿n periods the optimum is to set
combinations of both states of the environment. Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of (8) and (9).
[Figure 1 here]
The higher are the frequencies of litigation, the smaller is the discount factor or the higher is the persistence
of the environment then the closer are the ￿rst best standards to the true states of the environment. The
intuition is direct. The longer is the time in which a standard is in place, the higher is the net present
value of future corporations or the more likely is that the environment will evolve the more relevant is that
the standard properly regulates the future states of the environment. In particular, we identify the extreme
cases in which a forward-looking court sets the same standards that a myopic court. That happens when: i)
trials take place every period; ii) judges are extremely impatient or iii) the environment doesn￿ t evolve. The
next proposition formalizes these considerations
Proposition 1 (In general, ￿rst best standards don￿ t track the environment) Unless ￿ = 0 or ￿H = ￿L = 1
or q0 = 1 ￿ q1 = 0 courts should not set standards that are optimal for current times (sFB
n = sM
n ). In
addition, the higher the frequency of litigation (1=￿n), the higher the persistence of the environment at the
corresponding state (p￿ in the case of ￿L and 1 ￿ p￿ in the case of ￿H) or the lower the discount factor (￿)
the closer the ￿rst best standards to the myopic standards.
Proof: See Appendix A.
4.2.2 Frequencies of Litigation
Now, let￿ s assume that the standards sH and sL faced by corporations and the central planer are exogenously
given. We ask: is the periodicity with which society wants to have trials ￿FB
n (sH;sL) smaller or bigger than
the periodicity ￿c
n(sH;sL) with which single corporations would want to have them? In their decisions
20to initiate trials, defendants don￿ t take into account two externalities. First, a sentence of the court that
improves the law not only a⁄ects the utility of current corporations but the utility of future ones as well.
We call this externality ￿inter-temporal￿ . Second, the costs paid by the defendant don￿ t cover the totality
of the expenses generated in a litigation. We call this externality ￿contemporaneous￿ .
First we show that the inter-temporal externality is always positive (we will see that this is not evident.)
Next, noticing that the contemporaneous externality is always negative we conclude that trials take place too
frequently if and only if the later dominates the former. Finally, the most relevant, we discuss the scenarios
in which one or the other externality dominates.
The optimal value of all corporations can be expressed as follows53








pV (sL;1) + (1 ￿ p)V (sH;0) ￿ c








That is, at every period a court decides whether it is more e¢ cient to preserve the current standard or
generate a trial to verify whether the standard should be modi￿ed (notice that ￿L(1) = ￿L and ￿H(0) = ￿H).
Functions in (10) de￿ne cut-o⁄beliefs after which a central planer generates a trial with certainty. The cut-o⁄
beliefs are the ones that make a central planer indi⁄erent between litigation and no litigation. That is54
￿
1 ￿ pFB￿










pFB(sH;sL) = 1 ￿
fc + (1 ￿ f)c + ￿L
V (sH;0) ￿ V (sL;0)
(12)
and









53Problem (1), without restrictions (2) and (3), can be writen as a dynamic programming problem in which the state variables
are the beliefs of the agents and the current standard, the control variable is litigation ln, the law of motion is the Markovian
process p+
n = pnq1 + (1 ￿ pn)q0 with initial conditions pH(1) = 0 and pL(1) = 1; the return function is V (sn;pn) and the
discount factor is ￿.
54Again, w.l.o.g., we write the expressions as identities.
21or
pFB(sH;sL) =
fc + (1 ￿ f)c + ￿H
V (sL;1) ￿ V (sH;1)
(14)
We notice that the only di⁄erence in the problems faced by a single corporation and the society when
they have to reform the standard sn is En = (1 ￿ f)c + ￿n (compare (12) and (14) with (6) and (7)).
Clearly, (1 ￿ f)c corresponds to the contemporaneous externality and ￿n corresponds to the inter-temporal
externality. The central question is: what determines the sign of this externality? We start answering that
question by showing the next result55
Lemma 3 (The inter-temporal externality is always positive) If the cost of litigation is such that society
wants to generate trials with a ￿nite frequency and the standards sL and sH are such that sL ￿ ￿L+￿H
2 ￿ sH
then ￿n ￿ 0:
Proof: See Appendix A.
The formal proof of the lemma rests on the fact that ￿n(p) are convex functions.56 As usual, the details
can be found in Appendix A. In order to see more clearly the interaction between the externalities we impose
symmetry in the model (p￿ = 1




we rewrite (11) as57














where we have decomposed the inter-temporal externality in two e⁄ects ￿L = CE(c) + V E(W): The ￿rst
expression corresponds to the change in the litigation costs paid by future corporations because a trial takes
place this period instead of the next one (we call it the cost e⁄ect) while the second one refers to the change
in the value of future corporations due to the same reason (we call it the value e⁄ect.) We emphasize the
next properties
55The result is not conditional on sL ￿
￿L+￿H
2 ￿ sH. We impose this relation to eliminate shapes of the value function
that may be optimal in problem (10) but cannot be optimal in problem (1).
56The formal proof of the Lemma requires to show existence and uniqueness of (10). The analysis closely follows Harris and
Holmstrom (1987). The novelty which makes our problem more challenging is that the function
￿(p) =
￿
￿H(p) if p 2 [0;p￿]
￿L(p) if p 2 [p￿;1]
can be discontinuous at p￿.
57In order to derive ￿L we have used the following identities: ￿(1) = ￿L; ￿H(0) = ￿H; ￿L(1) = V (sL;1) + ￿￿L(q1);
￿H(0) = V (sH;0) + ￿￿H(q0) which implies that ￿L(pFB+) = pFB+￿L(1) + (1 ￿ pFB+)￿H(0) ￿ c: Notice that because in the
symmetric case ￿(1) = ￿L = ￿H(0) = ￿H = ￿; the inter-temporal externality becomes just [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿c ￿ V (sL;1)]. The
analysis for (13) is equivalent.
22￿ The cost e⁄ect is always negative (future corporations bene￿t with trials) because future corporations
save the cost of not having to pay for the trial that ends the current cycle ( ￿
1￿￿￿ c). Even when future
corporations face the extra cost of having to pay sooner for the trial that ends the new cycle ( ￿
￿
1￿￿￿ c)
the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates the second one. Directly from that, the inter-temporal externality decreases
on c (as we show it later, it is true that c increases the periodicity of litigation ￿, but as ￿￿￿￿
￿
1￿￿￿ is
decreasing on ￿ so is CE(c) on c:)
￿ The value e⁄ect is always positive (future corporations don￿ t bene￿t with trials) because future corpo-
rations don￿ t increase their value with a trial taking place the current period ( 1￿￿
1￿￿￿ r(￿)) as much as if
the trial (or equivalently the update of the law) would have taken place in the next period (V (sL;1)).58
Directly from that, the inter-temporal externality increases on ￿bW (as we shoe it later, it is true that
￿bW decreases the periodicity of litigation ￿, but as ￿ 1￿￿
1￿￿￿ r(￿) is increasing on ￿ so is V E(W) on
￿bW:)
￿ The importance of lemma 3 is that it tells us that, at equilibrium, the cost e⁄ect always dominates the
value e⁄ect, ergo, at equilibrium, the inter-temporal externality is positive (negative sign).
￿ When ￿ = 1 CE(c) = V E(W) = 0, which obviously means that the inter-temporal externality ￿ is 0
when trials take place every period.
￿ The value e⁄ect V E(W) decreases (increases) with sL (with sH) because the closer are the standards
to the true state of the environment the larger is the di⁄erence between the bene￿ts enjoyed by the
current and future corporations.59
But there is a second externality, this time negative, that a single corporation/defendant doesn￿ t inter-
nalize in its decision to trigger a dispute, that is, the cost faced by the plainti⁄ (1 ￿ f)c. A priory it is not
58Notice that when the length of a cycle is ￿ instead of ￿ + 1 (the standard is updated more frequently) the expected value






1￿￿￿+1 ) but the
highest increment in value and in litigation costs are faced by the ￿rst corporation!



























￿t￿1 [(1 ￿ pL(t))(￿H ￿ ￿L)]
)
< 0
23clear which of these externalities dominates, hence, directly from the comparison of (12) and (14) with (6)
and (7) we conclude that
Proposition 2 (Ine¢ cient frequency of trials) For any standards sL and sH such that sL ￿ ￿L+￿H
2 ￿ sH
and cost of litigation c > 0 if En < (>)0 then society wants a frequency of litigation greater (smaller) than
or equal to the one corporations will freely generate.
We postpone the sensitivity analysis of the aggregate externality (En) for the end of the Section, after we
have presented the second best solution. At this point we just want to notice that if the private and social
costs of litigation are the same then unambiguously society wants a higher frequency of litigation.
Corollary 1 (Contemporaneous externality doesn￿ t exist) If f = 1 then for any standards sL and sH
such that sL ￿ ￿L+￿H
2 ￿ sH and cost of litigation c > 0 society wants a frequency of litigation that is bigger
than or equal to the one corporations will freely generate.
4.2.3 First-Best Common Law Legal System
A central planer decides the optimal standard and the optimal frequency of litigation for each state of the




sL;sH 2 [0;1];￿L;￿H ￿ 1
Although now the standards are functions of the frequencies of litigation, the solution of (16) was char-
acterized in 4.2.1-4.2.2 and it is summarized as follows





L ) de￿ned by (8) and (9) with ￿FB
L and ￿FB
H implicitly de￿ned by the system
(￿FB
H ;￿FB





￿￿L (￿L ￿ ￿H) + ￿￿L




￿￿H (￿L ￿ ￿H) + ￿￿H
￿￿H (￿H ￿ c) ￿ 0
￿
Proof: See Appendix A.
The ￿rst best solution preserves the attributes of the myopic solution. Standards are set after cycles of
deterministic lengths ￿FB
H and ￿FB
L . There exists costs of litigation fcFB
L ;cFB
H g beyond which a central planer
24would prefer not to litigate because it is too expensive.60 The frequency with which one standard is litigated
decreases with the cost of litigation (as a fraction of the expected value of a corporation) and decreases with
the persistence of the environment at the corresponding state (for technical details see corollaries 2 and 3 in
the appendix.) Notice that because a larger c=￿bW decreases the inter-temporal externality, the e⁄ect on
changes of these parameters on the utility of the corporation that generates the trial dominates the same
e⁄ect on the utility of future corporations.
However, in reality corporations and not courts are the ones that initiate trials. Given the di⁄erences
between the private and social incentives to generate litigation, what standards should courts set?
4.3 Second Best Solution (Forward-looking Courts)
Forward looking courts face a trade o⁄ in their rule makers role. On one side they would like to set the
￿rst best rules for society but on the other side they know that if they do that, corporations will not
generate trials with a socially optimal frequency. Courts cannot initiate trials, hence they are not able to
correct this distortion directly, but they can use the standards as instruments to provide the right incentives.
More speci￿cally, we show that if the aggregate externality associated to the generation of trials is positive
(negative) a forward-looking and time consistent court encourages (discourages) litigation by biasing ￿rst-
best rules closer to (further away from) the preferences of corporations.
4.3.1 Second Best Standards
Although problem (1) tells us that courts decide the standards while corporations decide the timing of trials,
it is clear that through restrictions (2) and (3), courts also decide the timings. Consequently, the optimal
value of all corporations can be written as61








pV (sL(p);1) + (1 ￿ p)V (sH(p);0) ￿ c








As, with (10), at every period the court decides if it is more e¢ cient to preserve the current standard
60If the inter-temporal externality dominates the contemporaneous one then the maximum cost that society is willing to pay
in order to generate a trial is bigger than the maximum cost that corporations are willing to pay. But if the opposite is true
then for some ranges of the cost of litigation, corporations are willing to generate trials but the society is not.
61Problem (1), this time taking into consideration restrictions (2) and (3), can be writen as a dynamic programming problem
in which the state variables are the beliefs of the agents plus the current standard, the control variable is litigation ln, the law
of motion is the Markovian process p+
n = pnq1 +(1￿pn)q0 with initial conditions pH(1) = 0 and pL(1) = 1; the return function
is V (sn(pn);pn) and the discount factor is ￿.
25or generate a trial to verify whether the standard should be modi￿ed, the only di⁄erence with (10) is that
now, the standards are not constants but functions of the state variable. Then the indi⁄erence conditions
between litigation and no litigation de￿ne the following identities
￿
1 ￿ pSB￿
(V (sH(pSB);0)￿V (sL(pSB);0)) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
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V (sH(pSB);0) ￿ V (sL(pSB);0)
￿
= fc + (1 ￿ f)c + ￿L + ￿SB
L (18)
and
pSB(V (sL(pSB);1) ￿ V (sH(pSB);1)) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :


























> > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
or equivalently
pSB ￿
V (sL(pSB);1) ￿ V (sH(pSB);1)
￿
= fc + (1 ￿ f)c + ￿H + ￿SB
H (19)
From our analysis of the ￿rst best solution we recognize the contemporaneous and inter-temporal external-
ities ￿SB
L and ￿SB
H (obviously evaluated at the second best standards and frequencies). The new expressions
in (18) and (19) are ￿L and ￿H which correspond to the indirect marginal e⁄ects of ￿ on the ￿￿period return





















t [pn(t)(sn ￿ ￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ pn(t))(￿H ￿ sn)]: Because in the ￿rst best solution ￿rn
￿sn = 0
26we have that ￿L and ￿H don￿ t appear in (11) or (13).
In addition, as at the solution (2) and (3) hold, we know that
￿n + ESB
n = 0 (20)
which implies that
sSB



























The expressions for the second best standards uncover the structural link between the second best stan-
dards and the aggregate externality discussed in the ￿rst best solution. If the aggregate externality (evaluated
at the second best solution) is 0 the ￿rst and second best standards coincide. If the externalities are pos-
itive (ESB
H and ESB
L are negative) the second best standards are closer to the states of the environment
than the ￿rst best standards, the opposite if the externalities are negative (ESB
H and ESB
L are positive).
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the second best standards in the symmetric case (p￿ = 1
2 which means that




￿￿L) when the aggregate externalities are positive. Notice that there
is an in￿ exion point such that for periodicities of litigation (you may also think in terms of c=￿bW) larger
than a certain threshold, it becomes more important for courts to set standards that will help correct the




The former analysis was performed on the understanding that externalities EL and EH are evaluated
at the second best solutions. For consistency in the presentation of our results we are equally interested on
determining the link that exists between the second best standards and the externalities evaluated at the
￿rst best solution. Fortunately, that link is direct from (20). Because we know that @EL
@sL < 0 and @￿L
@sL < 0
but @EH
@sH > 0 and @￿H
@sH > 0 (notice that we can take derivatives as the standards are continuous variables)
we can immediately describe the second best standards in terms of the ￿rst best standards and the ￿rst best
aggregate externalities.
For example, if EL is negative, (20) is satis￿ed if and only if sSB
L gets closer to ￿L than what sFB
L is (by
reducing sFB
L we increase EL and ￿L, such that, at the second best solution EL still is negative although
27smaller than at the ￿rst best solution, while ￿L is positive.) Formally, we have that
Proposition 3 (The ￿rst best standards are biassed) If EFB
n < (>)0 courts set second best standards (sSB
n )
closer to (further away from) the ideal standards for current corporations (sM
n ) than what society would
ideally want to set (sFB
n ).
Proof: See Appendix A
Let￿ s see next that indeed courts bias ￿rst best standards as a way to encourage (discourage) litigation
by setting standards closer to (further away from) what is optimal for corporations (sM
n ) when corporations
generate too few (many) trials.
4.3.2 Frequencies of Litigation
From (18) and (19) we directly obtain expressions for the cut-o⁄ beliefs after which corporations initiate
trials with certainty (remember that ￿n + ESB
n = 0:) Those are
pSB(sSB
H ;sSB
L ) = 1 ￿
fc
V (sSB









L ;1) ￿ V (sSB
H ;1)
(24)
Proposition 3 together with a direct comparison of (23) and (24) with (6) and (7) allows us to conclude that
if the ￿rst best aggregate externality is negative, the court sets standards that generate trials with a frequency
that is larger than the frequency generated by the ￿rst best standards (that is pSB(sSB
H ;sSB





L ) > pc(sFB
H ;sFB
L )). The opposite is true if the ￿rst best aggregate externality is positive.
At this point we could be tempted to suggest that the second best frequencies are intermediate points
between the ￿rst best and the corporation frequencies. And indeed it is always true that













L ;0) ￿ 1
i
> 0 and













H ;1) ￿ 1
i
> 0: Nevertheless, it is not always the case that ￿;￿0 2 [0;1]: 62
4.3.3 Second-Best Common Law Legal System
If we join the analysis of the second best standards and frequencies of litigation we conclude that the second
best solution is characterized as follows
Second Best Solution: A time-consistent court sets standards sSB
H (￿SB
H ) and sSB
L (￿SB
L ) de￿ned by (21)
and (22) and corporations generate trials with periodicities ￿SB
L and ￿SB
H implicitly de￿ned by the system
(￿SB
H ;￿SB








￿￿L (￿L ￿ ￿H) + ￿￿L







￿￿H (￿L ￿ ￿H) + ￿￿H
￿￿H (￿H ￿ c) ￿ 0
￿
Proof: See Appendix A.
REMARK Notice that (1) admits a unique solution. It may seem that there are two solutions; one that
de￿nes low frequency of litigation and another that de￿nes high frequency of litigation but only one of them
maximizes social welfare.63 The reason of uniqueness is that the problem can be re-formulated as if the
court was able to directly set the frequencies of litigation instead of the standards. Because whenever the
court set standards, through the incentive constraints (2) and (3) it equivalently determines the frequencies
of litigation, the system of reaction functions de￿ned by the original problem coincides with the system of
Bellman equations de￿ned by the problem in which the court sets the frequency of litigations. Then, the
Contract Mapping Theorem assures the existence of a unique solution (see the characterization of the second
best solution in the appendix for details.)
4.4 Too many or too few trials?
Proposition 3 implies that the court should bias the standards in favor of the current litigants if and only
if the frequency of litigation is suboptimally low. But when is the frequency of litigation too low? or more
speci￿cally, when is the ￿rst best aggregate externality negative?
62Notice that if EFB
L = (1 ￿ f)c + ￿FB
L < 0 then ￿ = ￿
fc
EFB
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L ;0)
V (sSB





> 0 but we cannot conclude
whether ￿ is larger or smaller than 1.
63If the discount factor is big enough then the solution is not only a NE but also a PBE because if the court deviates from
its committed strategy it ends up setting standards that reduce welfare. In that sense there is a direct analogy between our
problem and the repeated game faced by two ￿rms that want to form a cartel. As it is well known by the literature (see Abreu,
Pearce and Stacchetti [1990] and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994]), the cartel (cooperative outcome) can only be sustained
if the reduction in the continuation value (future payo⁄s) induced by a one-period deviation is big enough to outweigh the
bene￿ts obtained by the deviation (non-cooperative outcome). That is the case when the discount factor is close enough to one.
294.4.1 Optimal distribution of litigation expenses
It is easy to see that the contemporaneous externality decreases with f while the inter-temporal externality
is not a⁄ected (notice from (11) or (13) that society only cares about c). The bigger is the fraction of the
total costs paid by the current corporation the more likely is that the frequency of trials will be too low from
the social point of view. Interestingly, the fact that defendants generate a trial every period if they don￿ t
face litigation costs (f = 0) together with the fact that society always want to have more trials than the
corporations when defendants face the totality of the litigation expenses (f = 1) tell us that there always
exists a cut-o⁄value f at which the inter-temporal and contemporaneous externalities cancel each other out.
At this level, the frequency of litigation is e¢ cient and the court does not need to distort the rules in order
to provide incentives. That is
Proposition 4 (Bound of the private costs of litigation) For all set of parameters there exists fn 2 [0;1]
such that En = 0. In particular, if p￿ = 1












Proof: See Appendix A.
Shavell ([1997], [1999]) already suggested that legislators can correct potentially ine¢ cient frequencies of
litigation by subsidizing or taxing the litigation expenses paid by the parties, nevertheless, in these papers,
the suggested subsidy or tax depends on the e⁄ort made by the parties to deter future accidents, which
ultimately make the expressions non-estimable.
4.4.2 The direct e⁄ect of litigation expenses
Along with intuition we have already proven that the corporations and ￿rst best frequencies of litigation
decrease with c. Next, we show the less intuitive result that conditional on the values of f and ￿ not being
too small, if the total litigation expenses are larger than a certain threshold then corporations litigate with
a frequency that is too low from the social point of view. The reason is that while corporations consider
a direct cost of fc when society decides if it wants to generate a new trial it considers a marginal cost of
litigation of 1￿￿
1￿￿￿ c. Hence, in the case that f > 1￿￿
1￿￿￿ we have that an increment in the aggregate cost of
litigation has a bigger impact in the incentives faced by a single corporation than the ones faced by society.
It is true that when ￿ is small (small values of c), the former inequality is never satis￿ed, but when ￿ becomes
large enough (large values of c) the inequality becomes f > 1￿￿ which very likely may be satis￿ed.64 That
64The value of f tends to be closer to 0:5 while the value of ￿ tends to be closer to 1:
30is, as it is formalized in the next proposition, although for low values of c the frequency of litigation may be
too high, when the total litigation expenses are high enough this same frequency is too low with certainty.65
Proposition 5 (Bound of the social costs of litigation) If p￿ = 1
2 and f > 1 ￿ ￿ there exists c such that for
all c > c litigation is too infrequent and courts bias the standards in favor of the interests of current litigants.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 not only is counterintuitive because it suggests that society faces an excess (a lack) of trials
in branches of the law in which litigation is relatively inexpensive (expensive) but it is also counterintuitive
because it contrasts with Shavell￿ s result that excessive litigation is more likely when c is large. Shavell
doesn￿ t retrieve our result because in his framework c doesn￿ t appear in the inter-temporal externality.
4.4.3 Activists or originalists judges?
On a di⁄erent angle, the model predicts that the a priori probability that a judge will reform a standard at
a trial (an activist judge in contraposition to an originalist judge who preserves the old standard) depends
on the frequency of litigation. The smaller that frequency, the stronger the information decay process and
consequently the higher the probability that the standard has become obsolete. That is, courts should be
active reformers of rules in branches of the law in which litigation is expensive but strong defenders of current
rules in branches in which is inexpensive. The message is clear: a ￿one size ￿ts all￿policy is not in the best
interest of society.
5 Robustness and Extensions
In this Section we brie￿ y comment on the robustness of the results. After that and given the conclusion
that the frequency of trials may be too low in branches of the law in which litigation is expensive, we use
our model to determine if two strategies suggested by legal academics as possible ways of increasing the
frequency of shareholder litigation are socially desirable. We ￿nish by considering whether society would be
better o⁄ if judges were setting contingent instead of rigid rules.
5.1 Robustness of the Results
In assumption 1 we imposed that the probability with which corporations make a wrong decision due to
the regulation is uniformly distributed. One may think that this is the reason why the ￿rst best standards
65Although the result is derived for in the symmetric model, we believe that it should hold for the asymmetric model as well.
31don￿ t track the environment. This is not the case: the majority of distributions imply that the ￿￿periods
return functions are not maximized by corner solutions.66 In addition, even if the ￿rst best standards
tracked the environment, the di⁄erence between the social and private incentives to litigate would prevent
the enforcement of the ￿rst best standards. In assumption 2 we imposed that agents cannot learn outside
trials. In reality agents learn from the markets. If every period corporations were able to discover the
true state of the environment with a ￿xed probability then whenever a business opportunity takes place
the cycle with the current standard would be broken and a new one initiated. Under these conditions, the
model still have a cut-o⁄ solution but the interpretation of ￿n is di⁄erent. This parameter becomes the
periodicity with which the standard sn is litigated conditional on that the agents have not learned the true
state of the environment before.67 Regardless of this new interpretation the main results (propositions 1-3)
are preserved. In assumption 3 we imposed that a business opportunity is not required to trigger a trial. In
reality, many trials take place in the middle of a takeover battle. If we add this condition to our model68 then
￿n becomes the periodicity with which corporations attempt to reform the standard. As an attempt is not
enough to generate a trial, there would be a period of random length in which the old standard is preserved
until a new trial takes place. Regardless that, our main results are also preserved. Finally, in assumption
4 we imposed that the court commits to its strategy. When the court does not commit to its strategy
then (1) has a multiplicity of PBEs but all of them preserve the property that the court bias the standards
towards (against) the interests of corporations when the aggregate externality is negative (positive). The
only di⁄erence is that a non-committed court sets standards that are closer to the ￿rst best levels than a
committed court. The reason is that a non-commited court doesn￿ t take into account the welfare e⁄ects of










t=1 ￿t￿1(1 ￿ pn(t))
P￿n
t=1 ￿t￿1pn(t)
= Hn(￿n);n 2 fL;Hg
It is easy to verify that only special cases as F0(x) =
p
x de￿ne corner solutions.
67With this small twist, the system of Bellman equations becomes





((1 ￿ zb)￿)i￿1 [pn(i)￿L + (1 ￿ pn(i))(￿H ￿ cb)]
#
+￿￿n [pn(￿n + 1)￿L + (1 ￿ pn(￿n + 1))￿H ￿ c]
with rn = (1￿z)
P￿n
i=1((1￿zb)￿)i￿1V (sn;pn(i)) and z the probability that a corporation learns from a business opportunity
faced by another corporation.
68The value function becomes







i=0((1 ￿ b)￿)i [pn(￿L + 1 + i)￿L + (1 ￿ pn(￿L + 1 + i))￿H ￿ c]
￿
where rn is as in our basic framework.
32a new standard on the cycles in which the alternative standard is in place.69
5.2 Law indeterminacy and the possibility of settlement
As mentioned by Kamar (1998), there are two reasons why legislators and courts could be interested in
keeping a certain degree of uncertainty in Delaware Corporate Law.70 First, broader and ￿ exible instead
of bright-line and narrow rules adapt better to the constant changes in the environment (corporations and
also courts have more discretion to interpret the rule.)71 For example, as described by Yablon (1989),
Delaware courts have clearly stated what kind of Poison Pills are legal72 but they have not clearly stated
when managers should redeem73 them. Given that ￿ exibility corporations would be able to condition the
redemption of the Pill on the type of business opportunity they face. Second, uncertain rules are more likely
to generate litigation because the parties may interpret them di⁄erently. This increment in litigation would
be desirable because courts would have more opportunities to verify the e¢ ciency of the standards.
It is important to notice that uncertainty generates trials of di⁄erent characteristics than the ones we
have studied so far (we call the ￿rst ones random while the second ones strategic.) While random trials take
place with an exogenously given probability (proportional to the degree of uncertainty in the law) strategic
69A court that deviates one period solves
max
sL
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is that the cross-derivatives disappear. Consequently, in the ￿rst case, the bias of the standards is smaller than in the second.
70His analysis is framed in the broader question of desirability of interstate competition in providing corporate law. He
suggests that Delaware can enhance his advantages over other states (more than halve of the Fortune 500 corporations are
incorporated in its jurisdiction) by developing indeterminate and judge-oriented law.
71In addition, general rules are cheaper to write. However the literature (as in Ayres and Gertner [1989] and more recently
Mahoney and Sanchirico [2005]) has emphasized that custom-tailored rules permit the regulator to make a more e¢ cient use
of the information owned by the parties in dispute.
72In addition to Moran, in 1998 the Delaware courts sentenced did not enforce the use of the dead-hand (pill that can only
be redeemed by the directors that adopted it or by their designated successors) and no-hand (pill that can only be redeemed
by the directors that adopted it or by their designated successors only after 6 months they assumed their jobs ) verisons of the
Pill in Carmody (723 A.2d 1180, 1998) and Mentor (728 A.2d 25, 1998) respectively.
73The pill becomes void.
33trials take place with a probability endogenously determined.74 Here, we concentrate on the second role of
uncertainty in the law and ask whether society is better with or without the existence of random trials.75
In Appendix C we show that society will prefer not to have random trials at all because they have two
undesirable e⁄ects: 1. they take place whether the law needs to be improved or not; 2. they reduce the
frequency with which strategic trials take place. However a numerical example suggests that if the litigating
parties have the option to settle their disputes and that option is neither too expensive nor too cheap, society
could prefer a non-zero level of ambiguity in the law. The cost of settlement cannot be too low otherwise
the parties at dispute will always prefer to settle their disputes and it cannot be too high otherwise they will
always prefer trials.
5.3 The Role of Agencies
Almost every major breakdown in corporate America that took place in the last century was followed by
a period of high regulatory activity (enforcement or enactment of new rules). Skeel (2005) documents that
states adjusted their bodies of regulation in response to the railroad failure of 1873, the Congress enacted the
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933-34 in response to the depression of the 30￿ s and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals of 2001. But should regulators only react after a
major crisis takes place? In this part of the paper we analyze the capacity of agencies such as the Security
and Exchange Commission or public prosecutors such as the New York General Attorney￿ s O¢ ce to correct
the ine¢ cient frequency of trials through the external generation of litigation. In appendix D we show that
if the agency is worse informed than corporations about the environment or the characteristics of the same
corporations76 its intervention will bias the frequency of litigation toward excess whether that is needed or
not. The reason is that while the agency is able to generate trials it is not able to prevent them from taking
place. If the frequency of litigation is suboptimally high then an agency cannot do anything and legislators
should use other corrective methods as imposing taxes or giving incentives to the parties to settle.77 If the
frequency of trial is suboptimally low, the agency can help correct the ine¢ ciency but it can also make it
74In order to verify that this distinction among trials is real we identi￿ed in Westlaw (online legal database that among other
services provides all the sentences of judicial cases (civil and criminal) taken place in U.S. jurisdictions since 1800 to the present)
all the judicial trials related to the use of the Pill that have been litigated in the jurisdiction of Delaware. We found a total
of 120 cases between 1985 and 2004. Among the 31 published opinions (listed in appendix B) that make direct reference to
the Pill (we leave aside 76 unpublished opinions and 13 opinions that make indirect references to the pill) we distinguished 9
strategic trials, 18 random (9 redemptions plus 3 conditional redemptions against 6 keep in place) and 4 that belong to other
categories. That shows us that indeterminacy is a relevant source of litigation.
75Consequently, our results may underestimate the social value of indeterminacy.
76Although it is true that the Division of Enforcement of the S.E.C. is permanently commited to conduce investigations in
order to determine when a violation has been made, it is a fact that it will have restricted access to information owned by the
corporation
77See Shavell (1997) for other suggestions.
34worse. At the end, the desirability of the intervention of these type of agencies will be a function of the
quality of their information.
5.4 Rigid or contingent standards?
A last point that we wanted to discuss is: why don￿ t forward-looking courts set contingent (rules that
are a function of t) instead of rigid rules? the answer is: it depends on the costs that the parties have
to pay to enforce the rule adjustments between periods, we will call them adjustment costs. What is an
example of adjustment costs in practice? In the case of the Unocal-Revlon proportionality test mentioned
in the introduction, all the costs incurred by companies to determine which actions managers can use to
resist a takeover o⁄er and not be deemed violations of their ￿duciary duties in the context of the current
environment. It is obvious that if there are no adjustment costs then contingent rules dominate rigid rules.
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sn if t = ￿n
trials still are generated every ￿n periods and the utilities of the ￿rst and last corporations in a cycle are the
same as with rigid rules, nevertheless the utilities of the corporations in the other periods within the cycle
are higher with contingent rules as V (s;pn(t)) is maximum when s = pn(t)￿L + (1 ￿ pn(t))￿H:78
But now, if any rule change induces an adjustment cost an > 0; it is clear that there exists values an > 0
such that for any a ￿ an courts set contingent standards but for any an > an they prefer to set rigid standards.
To see that, notice that the bigger are the adjustment costs the smaller is the number of adjustments that
courts will induce. When an has became large enough, courts will only induce one adjustment, at the second
period, that is courts will solve problem (1) with two variations: 1) sn(1) = ￿n and 2) the ￿n￿period return
function is rn = V (￿n;pn(1))+
P￿n
t=2 ￿
t￿1V (sn;pn(t))￿￿an. Hence if ￿n(scont
n (t;an);￿n(an)) are the optimal
values of current and future corporations when courts set contingent standards according to 1) and 2), cut-o⁄
values an are de￿ned by
￿n(scont
n (t;an);￿n(an)) = ￿n(sn;￿n)
78In the case that rigid rules optimally generate trials every one or two periods then rigid and contingent rules generate the
same aggregate utility.
35where the last expression are the optimal values of current and future corporations when courts set rigid
standards.79
6 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a theoretical framework that describes when and how courts should reform
legal rules. We determined the in￿nite horizon problem faced by a benevolent court that has to enforce a
standard rule each time that faces a trial, taking into account that the environment evolves and that the
parties rationally decide when to generate a trial. We showed that a forward-looking court should not set
the rules that the parties at dispute would have wanted before they signed the contract but the rules that are
optimal for the period of time that will take place until a new trial takes place. In addition, we showed that
because a court cannot reform a rule whenever it wants and the private incentives to generate litigation di⁄er
from the social ones, the rules will be biassed in favor or against the interests of current litigants. Finally,
we also showed that if the litigation costs are big enough the frequency of litigation becomes insu¢ cient and
courts set standards that are more favorable to the interests of current litigants than what society would
ideally like to have.
Our model opens the door for several avenues of future research. At the empirical level, work is needed to
determine whether courts are better described as myopic or forward-looking agents;80 in which branches of
the law the externality associated to the generation of trials is positive; and whether the sensitivity analysis
predicted by the model is accurate. At the theoretical level work is needed to understand the role of legislators
as a di⁄erent source of legislation;81 to determine the way in which courts should react to transitory shocks
in the state of the environment; to determine the optimal combination of general and speci￿c rules; and to
determine the optimal level of courts￿activism. The sooner we are able to understand the rule-making role
of courts in all its complexity the sooner we will be able to provide society with an e¢ cient law.
79In addition, it can be argued that contingent standards generate more litigation that rigid standards. There are two
reasons to believe that. First, due to the redistributive e⁄ects of a standard change, the harmed party will challenge the
adjustment and with that generate a trial. Second, if contingent standards generate higher utilities than rigid standards,
future corporations will have more incentives to attempt a change. To see this last point, suppose that contingent rules are
scont
n (t) = pn(t)￿L + (1 ￿ pn(t))￿H then in the context of the symmetric model we have that trials are generated when
￿bWp(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)2 = fc (25)
while for any other rigid rules trials are generated when ￿bW(1￿p)(sH ￿sL)(￿H ￿￿L) = fc in the case that the standard is sL
and ￿bWp(sH ￿sL)(￿H ￿￿L) = fc in the case that the standard is sH: Because sH ￿sL < ￿H ￿￿L it is simple to verify that
p is smaller than the largest root de￿ned by (25) while p is smaller than the smallest root de￿ned by (25). That means that
scont
n (t) generates more trials than any rigid rule. In particular, it suggests that if litigation expenses are high enough society
ends better o⁄ with a rigid rule than with contingent rules scont
n (t).
80We need a proxy that meassures the degree in which intertemporal considerations are present in judicial senteces.
81A source that has its own cost of reform and uses information of a di⁄erent quality.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 We solve the three-stage game when the standard is sL
Stage 3: P accepts the settlement o⁄er S if and only if
(1 ￿ ￿2)V (sH;p) + S > (1 ￿ ￿1)pU(sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)((1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿H) + h) ￿ (1 ￿ f)c
The left hand side is the utility of P if she accepts sH as the new standard for the corporation. The right hand side is the
utility of P if the court decides the new standard. If the new standard is sH then D has to compensate P in the amount of her
harm h = (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿H):82 Rearranging expressions, the constraint becomes
S > p[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L)] + (1 ￿ p)h ￿ (1 ￿ f)c
By its side, D makes the settlement o⁄er if and only if that satis￿es
￿2V (sH;p) ￿ S > ￿1pU(sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)(￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ h) ￿ fc
The left hand side is the utility of D if P accepts sH as the new standard for the corporation. The right hand side is the
utility of D if the court decides the new standard. Consequently the constraint is equivalent to
S < p[￿2U(sH;￿L) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿L)] + (1 ￿ p)h + fc
which de￿nes the set of all possible values of settlement as
S 2
￿
p[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L)] + (1 ￿ p)h ￿ (1 ￿ f)c;
p[￿2U(sH;￿L) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿L)] + (1 ￿ p)h + fc
￿





As the o⁄er is take-it-or-leave-it D o⁄ers S = p[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U (sH;sL)]+(1￿p)h￿(1￿f)c if p ￿ pS and
S = p[￿2U(sH;￿L) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿L)] + (1 ￿ p)h + fc otherwise. Clearly, only in the ￿rst case, P accepts it.
Stage 2: P decides to sue D when
(1 ￿ ￿1)pU (sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)[(1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿H) + h] ￿ (1 ￿ f)c > (1 ￿ ￿2)(pU(sH;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sH;￿H))
The left hand side is the utility of P if she decides to sue (which due to the value of the take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er does not
depend on whether the dispute is settled or goes to trial). The right hand side is the utility of P if she accepts the new standard.
Consequently the constraint is equivalent to
p[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L)] + (1 ￿ p)h > (1 ￿ f)c
p >
(1 ￿ f)c ￿ h
(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L) ￿ h
= pP
It is easy to verify that pS ￿ pP if and only if the following condition is true
c[(f ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (f ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L) ￿ h] ￿ ￿h(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sH;￿L)) (26)
such that when pS ￿ pP we have that: if p ￿ pS then P sues D and the parties don￿ t settle, if pS > p > pP then P sues and
the parties settle and if pP ￿ p then P accepts the change suggested by D: When pS < pP we have that: if p ￿ pP then P sues
D and the parties don￿ t settle, if pP > p then P accepts the suggested change without suing.
Stage 1: We analyze the cases in which (26) is true and false
If (26) is true then, if p ￿ pS then D initiates a change when
￿1pU(sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)(￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ h) ￿ fc > ￿1(pU (sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sL;￿H))
The left hand side is the utility of D if he decides to change the standard knowing that P will sue and there will be no
settlement. The right hand side is the utility of D if he doesn￿ t initiate a change. Consequently the constraint is equivalent to
p <
￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿H) ￿ h ￿ fc
￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿H) ￿ h
= pD
1
82We are aware that this expression can be negative which means that there are situations in which P must compensate D:
39If pS > p > pP then D initiates a change when
￿2 (pU(sH;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sH;￿H)) ￿ S > ￿1(pU (sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sL;￿H))
The left hand side is the utility of D if he decides to change the standard knowing that P will sue and the parties settle.
The right hand side is the utility of D if he doesn￿ t initiate a change. Consequently, after replacing the value of S; the constraint
becomes
￿
￿2 (pU(sH;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sH;￿H)) ￿ (1 ￿ p)h + (1 ￿ f)c
￿p[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U (sH;sL)]
￿
> ￿1(pU (sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sL;￿H))
or equivalently
p <
(￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿H)) ￿ h + (1 ￿ f)c
(￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿H)) ￿ (U(sH;￿L) ￿ U(sL;￿L)) ￿ h
= pD
2
Finally if pP ￿ p then D initiates a change when
￿2V (sH;p) > ￿1V (sL;p)
as in this case we know that P accepts the change immediately. The constraint becomes
p <
(￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿H))
(￿2U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿H)) ￿ (￿2U(sH;￿L) ￿ ￿1U(sL;￿L))
= pD
3
If (26) is false then, if p ￿ pP then D initiates a change when p < pD
2 . In this case P sues and the parties settle. If p < pP
then D initiates a change when p < pD





















(￿2 ￿ ￿1)(U(sH;￿H)U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sH;￿L)U(sL;￿H))
(1 ￿ f)[￿2(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sH;￿L)) + ￿1(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sL;￿H))]














(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H))((1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L))
(1 ￿ f)U((sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) + f((1 ￿ ￿2)(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sH;￿L)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sL;￿H))
as the litigation cost in which pP = pD
1 and
b cSP =
((1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿H))(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sH;￿L))
[(f ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (f ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿L) ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿1)U(sL;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sH;￿H))]
as the litigation cost in which pP = pS.
Then, as the following properties hold: 1) pD
1 (0) = 1; 2) pD
1 (
U(sH;￿H)￿U(sL;￿H)
f ) = 0; 3) pD
3 2 [0;1]; 4) pD





@c > 0; 6) pD
1 ￿ pS if and only if c < b c1; 7) pD
2 ￿ pS if and only if c > b c1; 8) pS(0) = 0; 9) pD
2 ￿ pP if and only if
c > b c3; 10) pD
3 ￿ pP if and only if c < b c3; 11) pP(0) < 0; 12)
@pP
@c > 0 and 13) pD
3 > pD
2 (0) there are only two possible order
relations for b c1;b c2;b c3;b cSP;b cS
3 and b cP
1 :
Case 1) 0 < b cSP < b c3 < b cP
1 < b cS
3 < b c1 < b c2 which means that for all c < b cSP; pD
1 > pD
3 > pD














1 > pP > pD
2 > pD















; pP > pD
1 > pD
2 > pS > pD




for all c > b c2; pP > pS > pD
2 > pD
3 > pD
1 . That is, if c ￿ b cP
1 when p hits pD
1 ; D initiates a change that is challenged by P,
the parties don￿ t settle and the court makes a decision. If c > b cP
1 when p hits pD
3 ; D initiates a change which is accepted by P
(there is no combination in which D initiates a change that is challenged by P and the parties settle their di⁄erences).
40Case 2) b c2 < b c1 < b cS
3 < b cP
1 < b c3 < b cSP which means that for all c < b c2; pD
1 > pD
3 > pD










3 > pS > pD
2 > pD















; pS > pD
3 > pD
2 > pP > pD
1 for all c 2
￿
b c3;b cSP￿
; pS > pP > pD
2 > pD
3 > pD
1 and for all c > b cSP
pP > pS > pD
2 > pD
3 > pD
1 . That is, if c < b c1 when p hits pD
1 ; D initiates a change that is challenged by P, the parties don￿ t
settle and the court makes a decision. If c 2 [b c1;b c3] when p hits pD
2 ; D initiates a change that is challenged by P and the parties
settle their di⁄erences. If c > b c3 when p hits pD
3 ; D initiates a change which is accepted by P.
We solve the three-stage game when the standard is sH (the analysis is analogous as when the standard is sL)
Stage 3: P accepts the settlement o⁄er S if and only if
(1 ￿ ￿2)V (sL;p) + S > p((1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿L) + h) + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ f)c
The left hand side is the utility of P if she accepts sL as the new standard for the corporation. The right hand side is the
utility of P if the court decides the new standard. If the new standard is sL then D has to compensate P in the amount of his
harm h = (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿L):83 Rearranging expressions, the constraint becomes
S > (1 ￿ p)[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H)] + ph ￿ (1 ￿ f)c
By its side, D makes the settlement o⁄er if and only if that satis￿es
￿2V (sL;p) ￿ S > p(￿2U(sL;￿L) ￿ h) + (1 ￿ p)￿1U(sH;￿H) ￿ fc
The left hand side is the utility of D if P accepts sL as the new standard for the corporation. The right hand side is the
utility of D if the court decides the new standard. Consequently the constraint is equivalent to
S < (1 ￿ p)[￿2U(sL;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sH;￿H)] + ph + fc
which de￿nes the set of all possible values of settlement as
S 2
￿
(1 ￿ p)[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H)] + ph ￿ (1 ￿ f)c;
(1 ￿ p)[￿2U(sL;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sH;￿H)] + ph + fc
￿
and that set exists if and only if




As the o⁄er is take-it-or-leave-it D o⁄ers S = (1￿p)[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H)]+ph￿(1￿f)c if p ￿ pS and
S = (1 ￿ p)[￿2U(sL;￿H) ￿ ￿1U(sH;￿H)] + ph + fc otherwise. Clearly, only in the ￿rst case, P accepts it.
Stage 2: P decides to sue D when
p((1 ￿ ￿2)U (sL;￿L) + h) + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ f)c > (1 ￿ ￿2)(pU(sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sL;￿H))
The left hand side is the utility of P if she decides to sue (which due to the value of the take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er does not
depend on whether the dispute is settled or goes to trial). The right hand side is the utility of P if she accepts the new standard.
Consequently the constraint is equivalent to
(1 ￿ p)[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H)] + ph > (1 ￿ f)c
p <
(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ f)c
(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H) ￿ h
= pP
It is easy to verify that pS ￿ pP if and only if the following condition is true
c[(f ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (f ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H) ￿ h] ￿ ￿h(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) (27)
such that when pP ￿ pS we have that: if p ￿ pS then P sues D and the parties don￿ t settle, if pP > p > pS then P sues and
the parties settle and if p ￿ pP then P accepts the change suggested by D: When pS > pP we have that: if p ￿ pP then P sues
D and the parties don￿ t settle, if p > pP then P accepts the suggested change without suing.
Stage 1: We analyze the cases in which (27) is true and false
If (27) is true then, if p ￿ pS then D initiates a change when
p(￿2U(sL;￿L) ￿ h) + (1 ￿ p)￿1U(sH;￿H) ￿ fc > ￿1(pU (sH;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sH;￿H))
The left hand side is the utility of D if he decides to change the standard knowing that P will sue and there will be no
settlement. The right hand side is the utility of D if he doesn￿ t initiate a change. Consequently the constraint is equivalent to
p >
fc
￿2U(sL;￿L) ￿ ￿1U(sH;￿L) ￿ h
= pD
1
83We are aware that this expression can be negative which means that there are situations in which P must compensate D:
41if pS < p < pP then D initiates a change when
￿2 (pU(sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sL;￿H)) ￿ S > ￿1(pU (sH;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sH;￿H))
The left hand side is the utility of D if he decides to change the standard knowing that P will sue and the parties settle.
The right hand side is the utility of D if he doesn￿ t initiate a change. Consequently, after replacing the value of S; the constraint
becomes
￿
￿2 (pU(sL;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sL;￿H)) ￿ ph + (1 ￿ f)c
￿(1 ￿ p)[(1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H)]
￿
> ￿1(pU (sH;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)U(sH;￿H))
or equivalently
p >
(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) ￿ (1 ￿ f)c
(￿2U(sL;￿L) ￿ ￿1U(sH;￿L)) + (U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) ￿ h
= pD
2
Finally if pP ￿ p then D initiates a change when
￿2V (sL;p) > ￿1V (sH;p)
as in this case we know that P accepts the change immediately. The constraint becomes
p >
(￿1U(sH;￿H) ￿ ￿2U(sL;￿H))
￿2 (U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) + ￿1 (U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sH;￿L))
= pD
3
If (26) is false then, if p ￿ pP then D initiates a change when p > pD
2 . In this case P sues and the parties settle. If p > pP
then D initiates a change when p > pD





















(￿2 ￿ ￿1)(U(sL;￿L)U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H)U(sH;￿L))
(1 ￿ f)[￿2(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) + ￿1(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sH;￿L))]














(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sH;￿L))((1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H))
(1 ￿ f)U((sL;￿L) ￿ U(sH;￿L)) + f((1 ￿ ￿2)(U(sL;￿L) ￿ U(sL;￿H)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sH;￿L))
as the litigation cost in which pP = pD
1 and
b cSP =
((1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿L))(U(sH;￿H) ￿ U(sL;￿H))
[(f ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿H) ￿ (f ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿H) ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿1)U(sH;￿L) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)U(sL;￿L))]
as the litigation cost in which pP = pS.
Then, as the following properties hold: 1) pD
1 (0) = 0; 2) pD
2 (
U(sH;￿H)￿U(sL;￿H)
1￿f ) = 0; 3) pD
3 < pD
2 (0) < pP(0) < 1; 4)
pD





@c < 0; 7) pD
1 ￿ pS if and only if c > b c1; 8) pD
2 ￿ pS if and only if
c < b c1; 9) pS(0) = 1; 10) pD
2 ￿ pP if and only if c < b c3; 11) pD
3 ￿ pP if and only if c > b c3 and 12)
@pP
@c < 0 there are only two
possible order relations for b c1;b c2;b c3;b cSP;b cS
3 and b cP
1 :
Case 1) b c3 < b cS
3 < b cP









; pS > pD
3 > pD
2 > pP > pD







3 > pS > pD
2 > pP > pD






















2 > pP > pS and
for all c > b c2 pD
1 > pD
3 > pD
2 > pP > pS. That is, if c ￿ b c1 when p hits pD
1 ; D initiates a change that is challenged by P, the
parties don￿ t settle and the court makes a decision. If c > b cP
1 when p hits pD
3 ; D initiates a change which is accepted by P
(there is no combination in which D initiates a change that is challenged by P and the parties settle their di⁄erences).
42Case 2) 0 < b cSP < b c2 < b c1 < b cP
1 < b cS








; pP > pS > pD
2 > pD
3 > pD
1 ; for all c 2 [b c2;b c1]; pP > pS > pD
2 > pD
1 > pD








2 > pS > pD







1 > pP > pD
2 > pS > pD






1 > pP > pD
2 > pD
3 > pS and
for all c > b c3; pD
1 > pD
3 > pD
2 > pP > pS. That is, if c < b c1 when p hits pD
1 ; D initiates a change that is challenged by P, the
parties don￿ t settle and the court makes a decision. If c 2 [b c1;b c3] when p hits pD
2 ; D initiates a change that is challenged by P
and the parties settle their di⁄erences. If c > b c3 when p hits pD
3 ; D initiates a change which is accepted by P ￿:
Proof of Lemma 2 First, we notice that ￿n can be rewritten as ￿n(￿L;￿H)zL+(1￿￿n(￿L;￿H))zH in which zn = rn￿￿nc
1￿￿n
and ￿n(￿L;￿H) 2 [0;1]: That is, the expected value of all corporations is a weighted combination of the value of basic cycles of
length ￿n that we have denoted zn: In order to show that ￿n is quasi-concave84 with respect to ￿n it is enough to show that





(1 ￿ ￿n)2 [￿￿(￿n) ￿ ln￿c]
in which ￿ =
￿bW(1￿p￿)
(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)(￿H + ￿L ￿ 2sL) and ￿(￿) = (1 ￿ (￿￿)￿)ln￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿ ln(￿￿) ￿ 0;8￿ (as ￿(0) = 0 and
@￿(￿)
@￿ = ln￿ln(￿￿)(￿￿ ￿ 1)￿￿ ￿ 0): Then @zn















[￿￿(￿n) ￿ ln￿c] +
￿n
(1 ￿ ￿n)2 ￿
@￿(￿n)
@￿n
which means that there exists e ￿n > b ￿n such that @2zn
@￿2
n
< 0;8￿n ￿ e ￿n and @2zn
@￿2
n
> 0;8￿n > e ￿n. Then, zn is concave up to e ￿n,














with D = (1 ￿ ￿LpL)(1 ￿ ￿H) + ￿HpH(1 ￿ ￿L) and
@(￿L(1￿pL))
















@￿H = p￿￿H [ln￿ ￿ ￿H ln(￿￿)] < 0. From where the quasi-concavity of ￿n follows. In order to show concavity of ￿n















@sn ￿ 0 () sn ￿ sFB
n (￿n), with sFB





1￿￿ < 0 which is enough to have
concavity ￿:
Proof of Proposition 1 It is easy to see that
sFB
H (￿H) = ￿H and sFB








1 ￿ ￿￿L = 1
and the last condition is satis￿ed if and only if ￿ = 0 or ￿L = ￿H = 1 or ￿ = q1￿q0 = 1: In order to show that @sFB
H (￿H)=@￿H <
0 and @sFB
L (￿L)=@￿L > 0 it is enough to prove that AL(￿L) and AH(￿H) are decreasing in ￿L and ￿H respectively which is
84f(￿) : R ￿! R is quasi-concave if for all x;y 2 R such that f(x) ￿ f(y) and for all ￿ 2 [0;1]; f(￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)y) ￿ f(y):
85If g(x) = h(x)u(x) in which h(x) 2 [0;1] is continuous and increasing in x and u(x) is cointinuous and quasi-concave in x
then, for any x0;x1 2 R such that g(x1) ￿ g(x0) and ￿ 2 [0;1] we have that: If x1 ￿ x0 then directly h(￿x0+(1￿￿)x1)u(￿x0+
(1 ￿ ￿)x1) ￿ h(x0)u(x0) and if x1 < x0 (as it exists x￿ such that h0(x)u(x) + h(x)u0(x) > 0 () x < x￿) we have that for
continuity of h(x) and u(x), g(y) > g(x0) for all y 2 [x0;x1]; in particular when y = ￿x0 + (1 ￿ ￿)x1:
86Notice that b ￿n can be 1 if ￿H + ￿L < 2sL:




1 ￿ ￿￿ =
￿￿




In order to show that @sFB
H (￿H)=@￿ < 0 and @sFB
L (￿L)=@￿ > 0 it is enough to prove that 1￿￿
1￿￿￿
1￿(￿￿)￿
1￿￿￿ is decreasing in ￿













H (￿)=@p￿ = @sFB
L (￿)=@p￿ = p￿(1 ￿ 1￿￿
1￿￿￿
1￿(￿￿)￿
1￿￿￿ )(￿L ￿ ￿H) < 0 ￿:
Proof of Lemma 3 In order to show that when society wants a ￿nite frequency of litigation the inter-temporal externality
is never negative we proceed in two steps. First we prove existence and uniqueness of (10) and then we prove that ￿n ￿ 0:
Existence and Uniqueness
First, we de￿ne ￿ = f￿;b;W;q0;q1;￿;￿H;￿Lg: As a central planer who faces standards sL and sH the court chooses the
timing of trials. In that case the optimal expected value of corporations when the court has beliefs p is given by
￿(p) = max
￿
W1(p) + ￿￿(p+);W2(p) ￿ c + ￿ [p￿(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿(q0)]
￿
(A0)
in which W1(p) =
￿
V (sH;p) if p 2 [0;p￿]
V (sL;p) if p 2 [p￿;1] and W2(p) = pV (sL;1)+(1￿p)V (sH;0);8p. In order to show that there exists
a unique ￿(p) satisfying (A0) we de￿ne the contracting mapping function T￿ as
(T￿u)(p) = max
￿
W1(p) + ￿u(p+);W2(p) ￿ c + ￿ [pu(q1) + (1 ￿ p)u(q0)]
￿
(A1)
and the (complete) space of continuous functions and continuous functions but for p￿ mapping the unit interval into the reals
as S[0;1]: Then, as T￿ maps S[0;1] into itself, it is monotone (u > v =) T￿u > T￿v) and for any constant ￿ satis￿es
T￿(u+￿) = T￿(u)+￿￿, it is a contracting mapping of modulus ￿: Consequently, the Contracting Mapping Theorem (see Harris
[1987] or Bertzekas [1995]) assures that there exists a unique ￿xed point (unique function u) that solves (A1).
Next, we show by construction that there exist values of c that we denote cFB
L (sL;sH;￿) and cFB
H (sL;sH;￿) such that
the function ￿(p;sL;sH;c;￿) (the unique solution of (A1)) has di⁄erent shapes if c ￿ minfcFB
L (sL;sH;￿);
cFB








or c ￿ maxfcFB
L (sL;sH;￿);
cFB
H (sL;sH;￿)g: In order to see that we notice the following points:
￿ If sL ￿
￿L+￿H
2 ￿ sH then V (sH;p) is decreasing in p while V (sL;p) is increasing in p:
￿ W2(p) is a constant for all values of p:
￿ cFB
L (sL;sH;￿) and cFB























￿ From (A1) it follows that c ￿ ￿ [p￿￿(q1;c) + (1 ￿ p￿)￿(q0;c)] is not decreasing in c and V (sL;p￿) > V (sH;p￿) () p￿ >
1=2 hence it is true that cFB
L < cFB
H () p￿ > 1=2.
￿ It is direct from the asymmetry of the problem that ￿(1) > ￿(0) () p￿ > 1=2:
At this point we impose that p￿ > 1=2 (the case in which p￿ < 1=2 is symmetric) and we use the former information to
prove that ￿(p) satis￿es the following four properties.
Property 1: It exists p such that ￿(p) is decreasing for all p < p ￿ p￿ and ￿(p) is increasing for all p ￿ p:
We show that T￿u map functions of this characteristics into functions of the same characteristics. As the solution is unique,
it has to have the same property. If u(p) is such that is exists p ￿ p￿ such that u(p) is decreasing for all p < p then we have
that W1(p) + ￿u(p+) is also decreasing when p ￿ p and W2(p) ￿ c + ￿ [pu(q1) + (1 ￿ p)u(q0)] = pu(1) + (1 ￿ p)u(0) ￿ c is
increasing in p. In addition as T￿u(0) = maxfu(0);u(0) ￿ cg = u(0) we have that T￿u(p) will be decreasing with certainty





W1(p) + ￿u(p+) if p < b p
pu(1) + (1 ￿ p)u(0) ￿ c if p 2 [b p;p￿]
max
￿
W1(p) + ￿u(p+);pu(1) + (1 ￿ p)u(0) ￿ c
￿
if p > p￿
The proof ends by noticing that T￿u(p) is increasing in p when p > p￿ because W1(p)+￿u(p+) is increasing in this region.
44Property 2: There exists p ￿ p￿ such that ￿(p) = W1(p) + ￿￿(p+) for all p > p:
As with the proof of property 1 we have that T￿u(1) = maxfu(1);u(1) ￿ cg = u(1). In addition W1(p) + ￿u(p+) and
pu(1) + (1 ￿ p)u(0) ￿ c are increasing functions in p when p > p￿: Then it follows that
T￿u(p) =
￿
pu(1) + (1 ￿ p)u(0) ￿ c if p 2 [p￿; e p]
W1(p) + ￿u(p+) if p > e p
in which it is not necessarily the case that e p = p:
Property 3: If c < cFB






then p < p￿ = p and if c > cFB
H then p = p￿ = p:
If c < cFB
L we just have to notice that (A2) implies V (sL;p￿) + ￿￿(p￿) < p￿￿(1) + (1 ￿ p￿)￿(0) ￿ c which means that
p￿ < p and as cFB
L < cFB
H we have that (A3) implies V (sH;p￿) + ￿￿(p￿) > p￿￿(1) + (1 ￿ p￿)￿(0) ￿ c which means that






then (A2) implies V (sL;p￿)+￿￿L(p￿) > p￿￿(1)+(1￿p￿)￿(0)￿c which means that p￿ ￿ p but still
V (sH;p￿) + ￿￿(p￿) > p￿￿(1) + (1 ￿ p￿)￿(0) ￿ c which means p < p￿ and ￿nally if c > cFB
H then p ￿ p￿ ￿ p.
Property 4: lim
#p￿￿(p) = ￿L(p￿) ￿ ￿H(p￿) = lim
"p￿￿(p)
Directly we have that
￿L(p￿) > ￿H(p￿) () V (sL;p￿) > V (sH;p￿) () p￿ > 1=2
The former characterization tells us that, depending on the value of c; ￿(p) has three possible shapes
1. If c ￿ cFB





V (sH;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p < p




V (sL;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p > p
(A4)












V (sH;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p < p




V (sL;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p > p￿
(A5)
in which ￿(p) is decreasing for all p ￿ p, increasing for all p > p and not necessarily continuous at p￿:




V (sH;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p ￿ p￿
V (sL;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p > p￿ (A6)
in which ￿(p) is decreasing for all p ￿ p￿, increasing for all p > p￿ and not necessarily continuous at p￿:
The next graphs summarize the possible shapes of ￿(p) (always under the assumption p￿ > 1=2)
￿:
￿n ￿ 0 when ￿FB
n (sH;sL;c;￿) < 1
45This part follows directly from the former characterization of the value function ￿(p): We assume that p￿ > 1=2 (the
analysis for p￿ < 1=2 is analogous) which implies that cFB
L < cFB
H . If c < cFB
L the value function ￿(p) is continuous
and convex from where by de￿nition it is true that ￿L = ￿L(pq1 + (1 ￿ p)q0) ￿ (p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0)) < 0 and ￿H =
￿H(pq1+(1￿p)q0)￿
￿
p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0)
￿







L (sH;sL;c;￿) = 1 but ￿FB
H (sH;sL;c;￿) < 1:
Then, ￿H can be rewritten as
p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0) ￿
h
p+￿L(1) + (1 ￿ p+)￿H(0) ￿ c
i
which is equal to h




p+￿L(1) + (1 ￿ p+)￿H(0)
i
< 0
if trials don￿ t take place every period and equal to 0 if they do. If c ￿ cFB
H then ￿FB
L (sH;sL;c;￿) = ￿FB
H (sH;sL;c;￿) = 1 ￿.
First Best Solution We proceed in two steps. First we derive the F.O.C. and then we show that they de￿ne a unique
solution.
First Best Solution
We proceed in two steps. First we assume that the frequencies of litigation ￿L and ￿H are ￿xed and derive expressions
for the ￿rst best standards, then we plug-in these expressions in ￿ and derive the conditions that implicitly de￿ne the optimal
solution. We know that the ￿rst best standards are given by sFB
H (￿H) and sFB
L (￿L). Then we plug these expressions in the
value functions and obtain
￿L = r(sFB
L (￿L);￿L) ￿ ￿Lc + ￿L [pL￿L + (1 ￿ pL)￿H]
￿H = r(sFB
H (￿H);￿H) ￿ ￿Hc + ￿H [pH￿L + (1 ￿ pH)￿H]



























































H we retrieve the three
same possible shapes of the function characterized in the solution of lemma 3. However, as now the standards are functions




H is not always satis￿ed. We show that for extreme values of
p￿ there still are three possible shapes of the value function but in all of them the function is always increasing or decreasing.

















We immediately notice that if p￿ > 1=2 then sFB
L ￿
￿L+￿H
2 and if p￿ < 1=2 then sFB
H ￿
￿L+￿H
2 : Recall that V (sH;p)
is decreasing in p when
￿L+￿H
2 ￿ sH while V (sL;p) is increasing in p when sL ￿
￿L+￿H
2 : In the same way we have that
W2(p) + ￿ [p￿(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿(q0)] is increasing in p if and only if p￿ > 1=2 that is because ￿(1) > ￿(0) () p￿ > 1=2 (see
Lemma 4). Then, there exist bounds p￿ and p￿ such that for all p￿ > p￿ the function ￿(p) is everywhere increasing while for
all p￿ < p￿ it is everywhere decreasing. Regardless that we can apply the same logic as before to show that the shape of ￿(p)
46can be decomposed in (A4)-(A6). The following graphs show the case p￿ > p￿:
￿:
Corollary 2 If cc
n is the maximum cost that a corporation facing standard sn is willing to pay to generate a trial then
for any standards sH and sL such that ￿H > sH > sL > ￿L if En(cFB







which society wants to have trials but corporations don￿ t and if En(cFB







which society doesn￿ t want trials but corporations will generate them.
Proof of Corollary 2 From the conditions that de￿ne p and p
(1 ￿ p)(V (sH;0) ￿ V (sL;0)) = fc + (1 ￿ f)c + ￿
￿
p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0) ￿ ￿L(p+)
￿
and
p(V (sL;1) ￿ V (sH;1)) = fc + (1 ￿ f)c + ￿
h
p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0) ￿ ￿H(p+)
i
we identify the maximum costs that corporations are willing to pay to have a trial as
cc
L =





p￿(V (sL;1) ￿ V (sH;1))
f
Then, cFB
L can be written as
lcFB
L = lcc




L ) + (1 ￿ p￿)￿(q0;cFB









while in the same way cFB







which means that if En(cFB
n ;￿) < 0 then cFB
n > cc






society would want to have trials but corporations
will not generate them. In the same way, if En(cFB
n ;￿) > 0 then cFB
n < cc






society would prefer not
to have trials but corporations will generate them ￿.
Corollary 3 The frequency with which a standard is litigated decreases with c, increases with ￿bW, is inversely related to
the time in which the environment is at the corresponding state and is inversely related to the expected value of all corporations
when the court enforces this standard:
Proof of Corollary 3 The sensitivity of ￿FB
H and ￿FB
L with respect to c and ￿bW is preserved under the symmetric model
(￿H and ￿L behave in the same way). In this case, the optimal frequency of trials is implicitly de￿ned by
￿bW(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
2(1 ￿ ￿￿)
A(￿FB)￿(￿FB) ￿ cln￿ = 0
The function A(￿)￿(￿) is strictly concave in ￿ with A(0)￿(0) = 0 and lim
￿￿ !1
jA(￿)￿(￿)j > 0: Although each c=(￿bW) may








A(￿)￿(￿)) it is easy to verify (through
47the second order conditions) that ￿FB
1 de￿nes a maximum while ￿FB
2 de￿nes a minimum hence ￿FB is increasing in c=(￿bW).
In order to prove that p￿ > 1
2 () ￿FB
L > ￿FB
H () ￿L > ￿H we proceed in two steps.
Step 1: p￿ > 1=2 () ￿FB
L > ￿FB
H We write the value functions as
￿L =
(1 ￿ ￿H(1 ￿ pH))(1 ￿ ￿L)









￿L(1 ￿ pL)(1 ￿ ￿H)








= ￿L(￿L;￿H)(zL(￿L) ￿ zH(￿H)) + zH(￿H)
￿H =
￿HpH (1 ￿ ￿L)









(1 ￿ ￿LpL)(1 ￿ ￿H)








= ￿H(￿L;￿H)(zH(￿H) ￿ zL(￿L)) + zL(￿L)



















If b ￿L and b ￿H are the frequencies that maximize zL(￿L) and zH(￿H) respectively then if p￿ > 1=2 we have that for any
sH > sL
b ￿L > b ￿H
and
zL(b ￿L) > zH(b ￿H)
obviously (A7) and (A8) are not satis￿ed, even more we have that
@￿L(b ￿L;b ￿H)
@￿L




(zH(b ￿H) ￿ zL(b ￿L)) < 0
which means that ￿FB
L > b ￿L > b ￿H > ￿FB
H : If p￿ < 1=2; then the same logic implies that ￿FB
L < b ￿L < b ￿H < ￿FB
H :
Step 2: ￿L > ￿H =) p￿ > 1=2 Rewriting (14) and (15) we have that
V (sFB
L (￿L);pL(￿L + 1)) + ￿(pL(￿L + 2) ￿ pL(￿L + 1))(￿L ￿ ￿H) + (￿ ￿ 1)(￿H ￿ c) = 0
V (sFB
H (￿H);pH(￿H + 1)) + ￿(pH(￿H + 2) ￿ pH(￿H + 1))(￿L ￿ ￿H) + (￿ ￿ 1)(￿H ￿ c) = 0
which implies that
V (sFB
L (￿L);pL(￿L + 1)) ￿ V (sFB
H (￿H);pH(￿H + 1)) =
[￿(pH(￿H + 2) ￿ pL(￿L + 2)) + (pL(￿L + 1) ￿ pH(￿H + 1))](￿L ￿ ￿H)




L + 1)) > V (sFB
H (￿FB
H );pH(￿FB
H + 1)) () ￿L > ￿H
The last equivalence implies that
￿L > ￿H =) V (sFB
L (￿FB
L );pL(￿FB




but the right hand side is the same as
pL(￿FB
L + 1)(sL ￿ ￿L)2 + (1 ￿ pL(￿FB
L + 1))(sL ￿ ￿H)2 <
pH(￿FB
H + 1)(sH ￿ ￿L)2 + (1 ￿ pH(￿FB
H + 1))(￿H ￿ sH)2
If we use sL ￿￿L = (1￿p￿ ￿AL(￿L))(￿H ￿￿L); ￿H ￿sL = (p￿ +AL(￿L))(￿H ￿￿L); sH ￿￿L = (1￿p￿ +AH(￿H))(￿H ￿￿L)
and ￿H ￿ sH = (p￿ ￿ AH(￿H))(￿H ￿ ￿L) then the inequality becomes
pL(1 ￿ p￿ ￿ AL)2 + (1 ￿ pL)(p￿ + AL)2 < pH(1 ￿ p￿ + AL)2 + (1 ￿ pH)(p￿ ￿ AH)2
48which after some algebra is equivalent to
(pL ￿ pH)(1 ￿ 2p￿) < (AH)2 ￿ (AL)2 + 2AL(p￿ ￿ pL) + 2AH(pH ￿ p￿)
and this relation is not satis￿ed if p￿ < 1=2 () ￿FB
L < ￿FB
H =) AH < AL because under these conditions the left hand side
is positive and the hand right side is negative ￿:
Second Best Solution The proof proceeds in four steps. First we show that a mapping one to one is possible between the
standards and the frequencies of litigation. That means that when the court sets the standards it determines the frequencies of
litigation. This property implies that the solution of the problem in which the court chooses the standards (de￿ned by the pair
of reaction functions) is the same of the problem in which the court chooses the frequencies of litigation (de￿ned by the pair of
Bellman equations). Then in a second step we use the C.M.T. to prove uniqueness of the solution. In the next the two steps
we show that the possible shapes of the optimal value function are the same found in the ￿rst best solution.
Step 1: One to one mapping between sn and ￿n: Before jumping to the problem with the integer constraint we analyze
the case in which this constraint is relaxed and provide some intuition of why this mapping is possible.































constraints bind at the equilibrium and de￿ne ￿H and ￿L as functions of sH and sL. But then we notice that we can retrieve
the same F.O.C. if the court decides ￿H or ￿L instead of sL (of course the court cannot choose sH). For example when the































and after multiplying by
@￿L
@sL the ￿rst equation and by
@￿H
@sH the second one we retrieve the original system. As conclusion, we
get the same solution whether the court chooses the standards or the frequencies of litigation.
When ￿n 2 N we need to take into account that the incentive constraints not necessarily bind at the equilibrium. Never-
theless we can still establish a one to one mapping if we notice that due to the concavity of ￿n courts choose a unique sn for
any given ￿n: Formally







￿n(￿L;￿H) j sn 2 IL(￿L;￿H)
￿















n ;p) + ￿￿H(p+);
￿
pV (sSB
L ;1) + (1 ￿ p)V (sSB
H ;0) ￿ c
+￿ (p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0))
￿￿
Then, we can apply the C.M.T. over
￿(p) =
￿
￿H(p) if p 2 [0;p￿]
￿L(p) if p 2 [p￿;1]
to show that it has a unique solution. This time both frequencies of innovation are determined simultaneously by
(1 ￿ p)(V (sSB
H (￿SB
L ;￿SB
H );0) ￿ V (sSB
L (￿SB
L ;￿SB
H );0)) = c + ￿
￿






H );1) ￿ V (sSB
H (￿SB
L ;￿SB
H );1)) = c + ￿
h
p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0) ￿ ￿H(p+)
i
in which p = pL(￿SB
L ) and p = pH(￿SB
H ):




H ) > sSB
L (￿SB
L ;￿SB
H ) for all ￿SB
L and ￿SB
H .
Property 2: p￿ > 1=2 () ￿(￿SB
L ;￿SB
H ) > 1 () sH + sL 2 [2￿L;￿L + ￿H] =) sL <
￿H+￿L
2 and p￿ < 1=2 ()
￿(￿SB
L ;￿SB
H ) < 1 () sH + sL > ￿L + ￿H =) sH >
￿H+￿L








H ) ￿rst decreases and then increases with c; sSB
L (￿SB
L ;￿SB
H ) ￿rst increases and then decreases



















Step 4: Possible shapes of the value function. Given properties 1-3, we have that V (sH;p) is always decreasing in p,
V (sL;p) and W2(p) are always increasing in p. Then the value function ￿(p) has the three same possible shapes identi￿ed in
Lemma 4. That is, there exist cSB
L (￿) and cSB























such that, if p￿ > 1=2
1. If c ￿ cSB






H ;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p < p





L ;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p > p













H ;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p < p





L ;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p > p￿
in which ￿(p) is decreasing for all p ￿ p, increasing for all p > p and not necessarily continuous at p￿:





H ;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p ￿ p￿
V (sSB
L ;p) + ￿￿(p+) if p > p￿
in which ￿(p) is decreasing for all p ￿ p￿, increasing for all p > p￿ and not necessarily continuous at p￿:
Finally, the F.O.C. conditions (for the problem with the integer constraint) that de￿ne the second best frequencies of
innovation are the same as with the ￿rst best solution, with the exception that now we must take into account that sL is a
function of ￿L. That is
(￿SB
H ;￿SB









￿￿L (￿L ￿ ￿H) +
￿￿L








￿￿H (￿L ￿ ￿H) +
￿￿H
￿￿H (￿H ￿ c) ￿ 0
o
which completes the proof ￿:
Proof of Proposition 3 In order to get some intuition we ￿rst show the result in the symmetric case. Then we solve the
asymmetric one. Without lost of generality we relax the integer constraint.































50First, it is easy to see that ￿(sL) is strictly increasing and convex in sL: In addition, from lemma 1 we know that ￿(s;￿) is
concave in s and quasi-concave in ￿. Then, we know that there exists ss and s￿ such that @￿







< 0 if and only if s > s￿: In addition, it is clear that there exists s 2 [min(ss;s￿);max(ss;s￿)] such that ￿ is increasing












= 0: That is sSB = sFB and ￿SB = ￿FB:
ii) ss > s￿ if and only if f > f:
In order to see that, we explicitly de￿ne
f =
￿bWp￿(1 ￿ ￿￿FB
)(￿H ￿ ￿L)(￿H + ￿L ￿ 2sFB)
c












< 0: Hence, it is not only true that ss > s￿ but also that at the unique solution of (A15) the following












and at the unique solution of (A15) the following relations hold: sSB > sFB and ￿SB < ￿FB. The proof ends by noticing that
E(c;￿) > 0 () f < f:
Asymmetric case: we use the same logic of the symmetric case but this time we have to distinguish two possible values of
































n if and only if fn > fn:
This time
fL =





























Proof of Proposition 4 The existence of fn was proven in the proposition 3. Alternatively we can reason as follows:
corollary 6 tells us that when fn = 1 it is true that ￿n ￿ 0 while when fn = 0 it is true that ￿n ￿ 0 because society cannot
litigate more frequently than every period. Then, by continuity we know that there exists fn 2 [0;1] at which ￿n = 0: Notice
that in general fL 6= fH:
In addition, when p￿ = 1







which after using (8)-(9) and noticing that because of the integer constraint when c is low enough such that ￿FB = 1 and
￿n = 0 then En(c;￿) = 0 if and only if f = 1 gives us the expression of the proposition ￿:
Proof of Proposition 5 Given proposition 3 we just need to show that it exists c such that for all c > c a central planner





￿bW(￿H ￿ ￿L)(sH ￿ sL)p￿ (A16)





















hence if the right hand side of (A17) is lower than the right hand side of (A16) the result follows. We have that
(1 ￿ ￿)c





￿bW(￿H ￿ ￿L)(sH ￿ sL)p￿
which is equivalent to
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ f)c




then, as by assumption ￿ + f > 1 we have that for all c > c = 1￿￿
1￿￿￿￿￿
￿bW(￿H￿￿L)(sH￿sL)p￿
f+￿￿1 it is true that ￿FB < ￿c ￿:
Appendix B: Poison Pill Cases in the Jurisdiction of Delaware
Table 1: Published opinions with direct reference to the use of Poison Pills
Year Case Sentence
1985 Moran vs Household (S) The use of ￿ ip-over Poison Pills is legal (i+)
1985 Unocal vs Mesa (S) The use of back-end Poison Pills is Legal (i+)
1985 Revlon vs MacAndrews (S) The use of ￿ ip-in Poison Pills is Legal (i+)
1988 Robert Bass vs Evans (R) Conditional redemption of the Pill (cr)
1988 City Capital vs Interco (R) Court required redemption of the Pill (r+)
1988 Grand Metropolitan vs Pillsbury (R) Court required redemption of the Pill (r+)
1989 Mills Acquisition vs Macmillan (R) Supreme court a¢ rms sentence in Bass
1989 Shamrock Holdings vs Polaroid (R) Appropriate to keep the Pill in place (r￿)
1989 In re Holly Farms Shs. Litigation (R) Appropriate to keep the Pill in place (r￿)
1989 Paramount vs Time (R) Appropriate to keep the Pill in place (r￿)
1989 Barkan vs Amsted (R) Appropriate to keep the Pill in place (r￿)
1991 In re MCA, Inc. (R) Conditional redemption of the Pill (cr)
1993 In re Sea-Land vs Simmons (S) Appropriate adoption of the Pill (i)
1993 QVC Network vs Paramount (R) Court required redemption of the Pill (r+)
1995 Unitrin vs American General (S) Appropriate adoption of the Pill (i)
1998 Carmody vs Toll (S) The use of dead-hand Poison Pills is Illegal (i￿)
1998 In re First Interstate Bancorp (R) Court required redemption of the Pill (r+)
1998 Mentor vs Quickturn (S) The use of no-hand Poison Pills is Illegal (i￿)
1998 Quickturn vs Shapiro (S) Supreme court a¢ rms sentence in Mentor
1999 In re Lukens (R) Appropriate redemption of the Pill (r+)
2000 In re Gaylord (S) Appropriate adoption of the Pill (i)
2000 Chesapeake vs Shore (R) Appropriate to keep the Pill in place (r￿)
2000 In re MCA Inc. (R) Appropriate redemption of the Pill (r+)
2001 Account vs Hilton (S) Appropriate adoption of the Pill (i)
2001 In re MCA vs Matsushita (R) Appropriate redemption of the Pill (r+)
2003 MM Companies vs Liquid (R) Appropriate redemption of the Pill (r+)
2004 Hollinger Intern. vs Black (R) Appropriate to keep the Pill in place (r￿)
(S): Strategic trial; (R): Random trial; (i+): successful innovation; (i): allowed adoption; (i￿): unsuccessful innovation;
(r+): redeem the pill; (r￿): don￿ t redeem the pill; (cr): conditional redemption of the pill
52Appendix C: Law Indeterminacy
As we are interested in determining if indeterminacy is an e⁄ective tool to be used in the case of a suboptimal frequency of
trials we assume that f = 1 and that p￿ = 1
2. That is, there are no contemporaneous externalities and the model is symmetric.
In order to model the presence of uncertainty in the simplest possible way we assume that in the case of no innovation a trial
can take place with a ￿xed probability ￿. In order to keep both kinds of trial comparable we assume that a business opportunity





(1 ￿ ￿)(V (sn;p) + ￿￿n(p+)) + ￿
￿
(pV (sL;1) + (1 ￿ p)V (sH;0) ￿ c
+￿ (p￿L(q1) + (1 ￿ p)￿H(q0))
￿
;










with r(￿;￿) = (1￿￿)
P￿







+ (￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿
i
in which @H
@￿ > 0, @H
@￿ < 0
and @2H
@￿@￿ > 0: First, (A18) tells us that the addition of uncertainty has no direct e⁄ect in the incentives faced by corporations
to generate trials (you can verify from the FOC that ￿ cancels out). Nevertheless, the addition of uncertainty do have an
indirect e⁄ect. As (A19) tells us, the expected value of corporations is a function of ￿: The higher its value the smaller the
￿￿periods return function and the higher the ￿perceived￿discount factor H(￿;￿;￿): The next proposition tells us that
Proposition 6 (Indeterminacy in the law) If random trials take place with probability ￿ then the periodicity of strategic trials





@￿ + ￿ @H
@￿
i
< 0 and @￿SB
@￿ > 0.





@￿ + ￿ @H
@￿
i
< 0: We proceed in three steps. First we show that
￿(￿;￿) is still quasi-concave in ￿. Second we show that ￿(￿ = 1;￿ = 0) < ￿(￿ = 1;￿) and third we show that ￿(￿SB;￿) is
decreasing in ￿:
Step 1: We can rewrite ￿(￿;￿) in the following way
￿(￿;￿) =
P￿
i=1 ￿0i￿1V 0 ￿ ￿0￿c0
(1 ￿ A)(1 ￿ ￿0)
(A20)
in which ￿0 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿; V 0 = (1 ￿ ￿)V (sn;p); c0 =
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)
1￿￿(1￿￿) c and A =
￿
1￿￿(1￿￿): Then it is direct that Lemma 1 also applies
to (A20)
Step 2: We have that ￿(￿ = 1;￿) =
(1￿￿)V (sL;1)￿(￿+￿(1￿￿))
1￿(￿+￿(1￿￿)) and ￿(￿ = 1;￿ = 0) =
V (sL;1)￿￿
1￿￿ from where
￿(￿ = 1;￿ = 0) < ￿(￿ = 1;￿) () ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0
and the last relation is obviously always true.
Step 3: Given steps 1 and 2 we know that ￿(￿;￿) can only have the next two possible shapes 1) ￿(￿;￿) > ￿(￿;0) and 2),
it exists ￿ such that for all ￿ < ￿ then ￿(￿;￿) > ￿(￿;0) and for all ￿ > ￿ then ￿(￿;￿) < ￿(￿;0): We show that ￿ is de￿ned by
the following relation
c =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿bW(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))
Now we prove that @￿SB
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87We are assuming that c is big enough such that ￿SB > 1. That allows us to write
￿L(1) = V (sL;1) + ￿￿L(q1) ￿ ￿c
and
￿H(0) = V (sH;0) + ￿￿H(q0) ￿ ￿c
53we already know that @H
@￿ < 0 and @2H








































= ￿(￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿￿2 [1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)ln(￿(1 ￿ ￿))]
>From where it follows that @￿
@￿ ￿ 0 ￿:
As courts internalize that there is a new source of trials that does not directly a⁄ect the incentives of corporations to
generate trials, adjust the standards in order to induce corporations to generate less strategic trials. In addition, as the courts
internalize that random trials are trials of ￿bad quality￿ they would prefer not to have them at all, that is, if society could
choose a level of uncertainty in the law that would be zero.
Finally, if the parties have the option to settle their disputes, that is, to pay a cost ￿c with ￿ 2 [0;1] in order to avoid
the randomly generated dispute (in this case the original standard is preserved) then random trials take place with frequency
￿r de￿ned by (1 ￿ ￿￿r)(￿H + ￿L ￿ 2sL)(￿H ￿ ￿L) =
2(1￿￿)c
￿Wb while strategic trials take place with frequency ￿s de￿ned by
(1 ￿ ￿￿s)(￿H + ￿L ￿ 2sL)(￿H ￿ ￿L) = 2c
￿Wb: As a result, conditional on a random dispute being generated, random trials take
place with a higher frequency than strategic trials if and only if ￿ > 0 and this di⁄erence is increasing in ￿. Society is interested
in increasing the frequency of trials nevertheless the higher is the cost of settlement the higher the cost that the parties will
have to pay if a random dispute takes place before ￿r: Although a priory it is not clear which e⁄ect dominates, next we show
through a numerical example that for a certain set of parameters there exists ￿ such that society will prefer to have a strictly
positive level of uncertainty.
The next graphs show the comparative evolution of ￿(￿) when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:005. In which
￿(￿) =
rr + rs ￿
￿
H0(￿;￿;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿s(1 ￿ ￿)￿s￿￿r￿
c
1 ￿ H0(￿;￿;￿)
with rr = (1￿￿)
P￿r
i=1 ￿i￿1V (s;p(i)), rs = (1￿￿)
P￿s











In addition, ￿s and ￿r are de￿ned by
(1 ￿ ￿￿s)(￿H + ￿L ￿ 2sL)(￿H ￿ ￿L) =
2c
￿Wb
(1 ￿ ￿￿r)(￿H + ￿L ￿ 2sL)(￿H ￿ ￿L) =
2(1 ￿ ￿)c
￿Wb
respectively. We assume that the rest of the parameters have the following values ￿L = 0:3; ￿H = 0:6; q1 = 0:9; q0 = 0:1;
54W = 100; ￿ = 2; b = 0:4; ￿ = 0:98; c = 1; ￿ = 0:001:
The optimal value of ￿(￿;￿ = 0) is 6954;86 while the optimal value of ￿(￿;￿ = 0:005) is 6986;03 which means that society
is better o⁄ with random trials than without them.
Appendix D: The Role of Agencies
In order to capture the information disadvantage of the agency we assume that it only knows the expected value of the
corporation E[W] (the same analysis is valid for ￿ or b). Suppose that E[W] > W; then the agency would want to generate
more trials than a fully informed central planner.88 Then, if En(c;W) > 0 society would want to reduce the frequency of trials
generated by corporations but in this case the frequency either will not change because the informational distortion (E[W] 6= W)
is not enough to compensate the aggregate negative externality or will increase because the distortion moves in the wrong
direction. On the other side, if En(c;W) < 0 then the agency would want to generate a frequency of trials higher than the
informed central planer, in that case the agency will generate a suboptimally high frequency of litigation. Suppose instead that
E[W] < W then the agency would want to generate less trials than a fully informed central planer. If En(c;W) > 0; then
the agency would like to correct the ine¢ ciency by generating less trials but it will not be able to do it because it cannot stop
corporations from generating trials. Finally if En(c;W) < 0 the frequency of litigation would increase but without achieving
the ￿rst best.89 As a result, the agency can only induce an increment in the frequency of litigation and its intervention will be
socially desirable only if the informational disadvantage (bias) is not too big.
88The higher the corporations value the higher the ￿rst best frequency of trials.
89A similar result is derived if we assume that every period the agency doesn￿ t have infomation about nature and believes
that every period it is at state H or L with the same probability. In that case ￿ = 0 and p￿ = 1
2. It is not di¢ cult to show
that in the symmetric model ￿FB(￿) is increasing in ￿ because the less persistant is nature the more frequently the standard
needs to be updated. As this analysis is independent of the sign of the aggregate externality we conclude that the agency will
attempt an innovation more frequently than what an informed central planer would like.
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